

"Let's listen to market voices, collaboratively promote policy implementation and guide social expectations in a positive way"

«要注重倾听市场声音,协同推进政策实施和预期引导,塑造积极的社会预期»

— Premier Li Qiang presenting Government Work Report on 5th March 2025

2025 "Two Sessions" – implementing reforms as follow-through from the "Third Plenum" in the face of insufficient domestic demand and Trump 2.0

CMG Primer

20th March 2025

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China Macro Group (CMG)

China Macro Group (CMG) – a specialized European management consulting and research firm



Profile

- cMG is an agile, service-minded and innovative management consulting and research firm
- CMG serves European corporate, investment and public sectors on China related questions
- It specializes in aiding strategic decision-making of governance and executive bodies
- CMG contributes content publicly via various initiatives such as Primers and webinars
- CMG operates with presences in Zurich, Munich and Beijing

Our approach

Cross-cultural epistemic

Team dialectics, socio-economic grounded China analysis and accountable also to Chinese discourse

Interdisciplinarity

Business management/strategy, public policy, macroeconomy and geopolitics/geoeconomics

"Multipolar" analytics

For geopolitical/geoeconomic analysis actively use or seek expertise and views from respective "pole"

Research values

Original, fact-based and calibrated – plus extensive Chinese expert network

Professional services DNA

Listening, ownership and co-creation as foundation to build trusted and tailored collaborations

Our value proposition – 4 service areas

Consulting

- Strategy devising / review
- China development scenarios
- HQ-subsidiary alignment





Briefing

- China's development strategy
- Strategic business context
- Market/competitive trends





Monitoring

- Strategic business context
- Sector / market factors
- Geopolitical / risk factors





Curation

- Learning conference / training
- Event/webinar moderation
- Speaker/expert referrals





























Editorial info

What is a CMG Primer?

- CMG develops primers on select China-related issues CMG deems particularly relevant for European businesses and investors in times of heightened geopolitical friction and fragmenting policy and regulatory trends towards better understanding the rapidly evolving China policy environment
- A CMG Primer concisely analyzes a critical event, trend or phenomenon in CMG's scope of policy, market and international affairs relating to the Chinese market, typically covering drivers, factors and key impacts for strategic corporate decision-making
- Primers are CMG's public research products to inform a broad audience and engage beyond our clients with stakeholders, partners and media on emerging issues of strategic interest as such, these primers are distinctly different from tailored and confidential client products
- CMG works with a variety of partners and platforms to distribute its primers they are also all available here on the CMG website

How are CMG Primers prepared?

• CMG adheres to the same standards in its primers following rigorously fact-based, original and calibrated research and analysis as in its client products

Also refer to the earlier CMG Primer "Chinese government remodeled at Two Sessions 2023 – policy, people and structure" (March 2023)







- 1 Baseline: China's economy into 2025
 - Recap: China's evolved development strategy since the 14th Five-Year-Plan
 - Reform priorities as per "Third Plenum" in July 2024
 - Post-Covid economic recovery and macro-economic management
- 2 Key substance of the 'Two Sessions' 2025
 - Recap: polity and process
 - Agenda, key scenic moments and core policy implementation priorities today
 - Macro-economic measures, fiscal budget and lawmaking
- 3 Key take-aways for foreign business



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'Dual Circulation' as core of development strategy shift introduced in 2020/2021 relies on 6 key policy pillars

Ultimate goal


以中国式现代化 全面推进中华民族伟大复兴 Build China into a modernised socialist country and realise rejuvenation of Chinese nation 全面建设社会主义现代化国家,实现中华民族伟大复兴

How to reach the goal



Pursue High-Quality-Development with the "new development pattern" 构建新发展格局,推动高质量发展

How to pursue it



Policymaking across 6 pillars of 'Dual Circulation' shows deviation from pre-14th FYP trajectory

Policy substance of 'Dua	Deviations compared to pre-14th FYP policy trend		
1 Industrial upgrading	 Enhance indigenous innovation SSSR*, modernized and complete industrial system Unleash growth potential of service sector 	 Mobilized national resources to enhance innovation Enterprises as core actor to innovate Stronger industrial support to local/localized players 	
Market-oriented reforms	 SOE reform to sharpen SOE competitiveness Unleash the potential of all types of market entities Market governance progression 	 Stronger roles to SOEs and state-owned economy Strengthened ideological control over business 	
Coordinated urban-rural & regional development	 Rural revitalization and common prosperity People-centered urbanization (incl. livelihood) Balanced regional development 	 Rebalanced societal interest against economic interest—sometimes prioritizing societal interest with a trade-off of economic loss 	
High-level opening-up	 Broaden opening-up in more sectors Chinese firms 'going-out', incl. both export and ODI More active participation in global governance 	 More institutional reform e.g. proactive alignment with global economic standards Leveraged connectivity with BRI, BRICS, global south 	
Domestic demand system	 Expand domestic consumption Increase efficiency and return of investment Build unified market 	 Coordinated SSSR and domestic demand expansion, SSSR more driven by market demand More trade activities within domestic market 	
6 Coordinate development and security	 Ensure economic resilience esp. food & energy supply, industrial- and supply-chain resilience, and technological self-reliance 	 Rebalanced security interest against economic development interest—sometimes prioritizing security with a trade-off of economic loss 	

^{*}Note: SSSR = Supply-side structural reform



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New reform priorities as per "Third Plenum" (July 2024) show momentum across economic reform categories

Addressing key reform areas with select entirely new reform measures — as compared to NPC 2024 **Execution since July 2024 / examples** Improve equal treatment between state-owned and private economy, esp. regarding access Draft of Private Economy **Socialist market** to factors of production, market access and legal protection **Promotion Law** economy Defined more SOE responsibilities in innovation, industrial upgrading and national security Draft "Made-in-China" definition Expanding innovative talent supply, e.g. via promoting international knowledge exchange 2024 National Key R&D Program **New-quality** Effective policy coordination – vertically between central and local governments Special financing scheme for **Economic reforms** productive forces high-tech SMEs ("hidden Ensuring financing of innovation, e.g. via foreign VC/Pes (industrial policy + champions") Refined industrial upgrading blueprint: upgrade traditional industries (via standards), S&T innovation policy) cultivate strategic emerging industries (via policy system), and build early leading position in future industries (via fundraising mechanism) Closer policy coordination Systemic policy design and effective policy coordination – horizontally among ministries Macro-economic between PBOC and MOF on Improve financial capability and granting more financial autonomy for local governments governance counter-cyclical measures • Proactive alignment (主动对接) with global economic standards · Broadened pilot programs e.g. **Opening-up** Unilateral opening-up to least developed economies cross-border data transfer "Systemic trade policy making (贸易强国制度支撑和政策支持体系)" Broadened visa-free entry **Urban-rural** Further equal treatment to rural immigrants, esp. for access to public service based on long- Announcement of enhanced Social and term residency public service provision to rural development and eforms social security • Measures to restore population growth, e.g. birth-giving subsidy and public childcare service immigrants Restrictions on "immoral More effective governance on all-media channels and (esp. online) public opinion Media governance behaviors" by self-media Security Ensuring China's security interest, mainly—supply-chain resilience, technological self-reliance, Coordinate 2025 export control list for risk-responding mechanism for trade activities development and "dual-use items" released

Special focus on holistically coordinating supply chain of strategic minerals



security

^{*}NQPF = "New Quality Productive Forces", a policy term for S&T and industrial policy, invented by Xi during his visit to Heilongjiang in Sep 2023

Vice-Premier Ding at WEF: pledges to work with foreign business to improve China's business environment

Key statements and take-aways for foreign business across five reform themes



China's Vice Premier DING Xuexiang on Jan 21st 2025 delivering a special address at the WEF 2025

"I know, in reality, there might be cases where invisible barriers and hidden hurdles stand in the way of both FIEs and domestic ones...we sincerely hope to work out these problems with all of you.."

----VP DING Xuexiang

Engagement with "Global South"

Ding mentioned China's intent to help "third countries" (各国) develop emerging and future industries via building new-type infrastructure incl. Al, smart transportation or smart energy. That is in line with Beijing's new overarching economic policymaking principle of developing "New-quality productive forces", which is meant to drive integration of the innovation value-chain and help increase China's TFP. Pushing this interpretation further, this means that China's ongoing efforts of engaging with "Global South" countries under the framework of the BRI, will see a broadening towards exporting "new-type" of infrastructure, thus drawing on Chinese corporate capabilities beyond EPCs.

Economic perception and challenges:

On China's economy, Ding described the key challenges faced while framing the deteriorated external environment plus the trade-off effects from China's structural reforms as key root-causes. He also reiterated China's current policy stance of "effectively pursuing higher-quality economic growth and appropriately increasing economic output" (推动经济实现质的有效提升和量的合理增长). This is particularly in line with Pan Gongsheng's speech in late October last year which we see as the most explicit and "didactic" clarification that Chinese leaders know that short-term growth is the prerequisite to sustain China's longer-term structural reforms. Based on this, Chinese government took counter-cyclical macroeconomic interventions in September and October last year which Pan framed as a short-term "fix" (校正).

China's opening-up efforts

Although at the risk of being overheard by the international business community, VP Ding gave convincing examples – e.g. shortened FDI negative list from 190 items in 2013 to 29 in 2024, full removal of FDI barriers in the manufacturing sector, trade of service governance changed to negative list-approach, as well as the opening-up of more sectors including telecom, medical and education. **Accelerated opening-up efforts by China with special emphasis on least developed countries** can be witnessed. The "*Third Plenum*" held in July 2024 decided a variety of reforms including opening-up measures already under conscious premise of Trump's re-election, thus casting a **strategic response to Tump 2.0**.

China's trade relations

Regarding trade connections, it is noteworthy that Ding stated that China does not seek "trade surpluses" but is willing to import more competitive quality products and services to reach a better balance. Referring to President Xi's earliest commitment in this same reign at the 4th CIIE in 2021 to develop towards more balanced trade relations (促进贸易平衡发展), China has indeed been trying to increase its share in global total imports with a 0.1% YOY increase for the first three quarters in 2024, reaching 10.5% of global total imports.

China vowing to treat FIEs equally

Finally, on China's business environment for foreign capital, Ding stressed many measures to guarantee "National Treatment" of FIE. He reiterated, in line with the core take-away from the "Third Plenum" last year, that different capital forms shall henceforth be treated more equally in China's economy, and gave the draft definition of what "Made in China" means in context of public procurement processes. He was clear-eyed on a host of implementation issues still persisting and invited foreign business to actively work with Chinese government to implement these reform measures.




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Economic performance in last 5 years: post-pandemic economic recovery is an unexpected struggling process

China's quarterly GDP growth over the past 5 years



CEWC 2024: first time adjusting to prioritize short-term growth over longer-term reforms since CEWC in 2022

Dimensions	2025 policy focus as per key changes made in CEWC 2024 compared to 2023	CMG assessment		
Status perception	 Perceived "not few" (不少) economic difficulties in 2024 rather than merely "some (一些)" in 2023, and "insufficient demand" remains the biggest challenge Being more explicit about the fact that some businesses facing challenges and households are dealing with job insecurity and income Perceived a further deteriorated external environment 	 Heightened "crisis" perception observed in top-level policy thinking Such thinking paves road for introduction of stronger or bolder interventions in 2025 for restoring economy 		
High-level policy- making principles	 Set goal to maintain economic growth, ensure job creation, and stabilize consumer price Removed "cross-cyclical macroeconomic management (跨周期调节)", and stressed "more proactive and effective (更加积极有为)" (counter-cyclical) interventions for domestic demand expansion 	A signal for Beijing to temporarily prioritize short-term growth revival over long-term development interest e.g. structural reforms		
Macroeconomic policy	 Monetary policy: changed from "flexible but prudent (稳健灵活)" to "moderately loose (适度宽松)"; announced new rounds of cut in policy interest rate and RRR; newly addressed PBOC's using innovative tools to stabilize financial market Fiscal policy: changed from "moderately adding efforts (适度加力)" to "more proactive (更加积极)"; newly stated to focus spending on improving livelihood and consumption boost 	 Strongest monetary easing signal after GFC Broadened PBOC role in supporting financial market e.g. inject liquidity to stock market Fiscal spending no longer (at least in a near term) focuses on supply but demand side 		
Demand vs supply	 Domestic demand expansion esp. consumption is positioned as the primary policy focus, compared to the second place in 2023, new policy package announced e.g. increase pension and SHI subsidies Industrial upgrading deprioritized to be the secondary policy focus 	 Consumption boost as core effort in 2025, but such consumption-centered policy making so far remains a post-pandemic recovery logic 		
Domestic risk containment	 Newly articulated to "consistently putting efforts (持续用力)" to stabilize real estate market, and promote the consumption of inventory housing 	 Release of demand potential (e.g. cheaper loan) and relaxation on financing developers (e.g. whitelist) will continue 		
Reform implementation	 Proceeded improving financial capability and granting more financial autonomy for local governments Proceeded promoting introduction mid- and long-term capital into capital market 	The only two proceeded reforms serve tackling local debt and stabilizing capital market		




Effectiveness of interventions: initially positive trends observed in both demand- and supply-side (by Jan 2025)


Demand-side indicators

Core Consumer Price Index (monthly YOY change in %) 1.2 **Policy** 1.0 intervention 0.7 0.8 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.0 März-24 Mai-24 Juli-24 Nov.-24 Jan.-24 Sept.-24 Jan.-25


Supply-side indicators



Social Retail Sales (monthly YOY change in %)



Manufacturing Purchasing Manager's Index (monthly YOY change in %)



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Key bodies overview: NPC as legislator and nominal decision maker, CPPCC as consultative discussion forum

Lens	National People's Congress (NPC)	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)
Status	 The highest de jure organ of the PRC, cf. the PRC constitution Art. 57ff.— concentration of legislative, executive and judicial functions; government as NPC's implementation arms 	 A united front organ serving as a purely consultative platform to conduct multi-Party cooperation and political consultation among non- administrative elites, no decision-making power
Roles	 Amend the PRC Constitution and supervise its enforcement Enact and amend basic laws Appoint and remove from office members of central state organs Determine major state issues: deliberate and approve the state economic plan and budget deliberate and approve the government institutional reform decide on "peace or war question" 	 Political consultations prior to final decision-making on state policies and major state issues Democratic supervision by means of opinions & suggestions on the enforcement of law and implementation of policy Participation in and deliberation of state affairs by delivering public opinions & suggestions to CCP and state organs
Meeting forms	 Plenary sessions: all deputies take note of work reports of state organs and NPC Standing Committee, approve bills/proposals/plans, and make critical decisions and appointments Delegate group meetings and sub-group meetings: deputies divided into groups by electoral body (31 provinces + 3 SARs + Military) to deliberate bills/proposals/plans; large-size delegate groups are further divided into sub-groups for close discussions 	 Plenary sessions: all deputies take note of work report of CPPCC Standing Committee, appoint the CCPCC Chairman and amend the CCPCC rules Group meetings: discuss important proposals and policy decisions Sectoral group meetings: group discussions held by 34 «sectors» (界别), including all democratic parties and participants from all industries, to discuss critical issues in their respective fields
Key outputs	 Approve work reports: State Council work and budget reports, plus Supreme People's Court and Supreme People's Procuratorate reports Approve national plans: FYPs, plus annual economic and budget plans Approve organizational/admin changes: institutional reform plans 	 Approve work report: CCPCC Standing Committee work report Approve annual report on selected proposals for NPC/ central government Approve admin changes within CCPCC



Approve constitutional amendment and legal changes

Approve CCPCC's Political Resolution (政治决议), consultation summary

Delegations and political legitimacy: solid CCP control on NPC and CPPCC via delegate selection

Dimension



National People's Congress (NPC)



Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC)


- **~3000 delegates** elected from 35 electoral bodies (31 provinces + HK/MAC/TW + military) via hierarchical electoral system
- Elected for a 5-year term (13th NPC: 2018-2023)
- Delegation
- National People's Congress

 31 Provincial People's Congress + HK, MK, TW, military delegation

 Prefectural People's Congress

 County-level People's Congress

 Electorates (PRC citizens aged 18+ with political right)
- ~2200 members from CCP, democratic parties, social organizations and society groups selected by CCP United Front Department
- Aligned with NPC term (13th CPPCC: 2018-2023)



Recommendation and selection

Composition of delegates

- Analysis of ~3000 NPC delegates in terms of:
 - Political affiliations: ~70% CCP members and ~30% from democratic parties or are politically independent
 - Social backgrounds: ~15% workers and peasants, ~10% soldiers and officers and ~35% functionaries
 - Gender/ethnic background: ~25% female, ~15% minorities


- Of ~2200 CPPCC delegates:
 - ~20% from political parties (CCP and 8 democratic parties)
 - ~15% from <u>social organizations</u>: e.g. Youth League
 - ~60% from industry sectors: e.g. celebrities, scientists
 - ~5% are specially invited representatives from HK/MAC/PLA
- In total, ~40% delegates are CCP members

Particularities

- **Military highly overrepresented** in NPC: «delegate ratio for military 1:10,000» vs «delegate ratio for civilians 1:400,000»
- CCP's dominance in NPC enables strong Party influence on NPC
- Economically developed provinces more strongly represented in NPC Standing Committee
- Though CCP members only represent less than half of the delegates, the CCP is strongly represented in the CCPCC's leadership:
 - Usually, the CCPCC Chairman is a member of CCP Politburo Standing Committee
 - 12 of 23 CPPCC Vice-Chairmen are CCP members in 14th CCPCC SC



~3000 NPC delegates convene in the Great Hall of the People – facing the NPC Presidium and CPP Politburo




¹ In the 2nd to 5th Session in recent years, the NPC Presidium Executive Chairpersons were constituted by the complete 16 members of the NPC Standing Committee Council of Chairpersons



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Agenda of 2025 "Two Sessions": 8 busy days in Beijing, delivering Government and NDRC reports as core events



Notes: NDRC = National Development and Reform Commission; NPC-SC = National People's Congress Standing Committee; SPC = Supreme People's Court; SPP = Supreme People's Court

Highlights

Key moments of the 2025 "Two Sessions", the highest annual national political gathering, which spanned 8 days



NPC press conference ahead of 'Two Sessions' on 4th March



Premier Li Qiang presents Government Work Report at the 1st plenary of the NPC on 5th March



Xi Jinping at Jiangsu delegates' meeting speaking about "technological and industrial innovation" on 5th March




Review of report on implementation of 2024 Development Plan and draft of 2025 Development Plan on 6th March



Review of report on the central and local budgets and the draft of 2025 budgets on 6th March



Press conference on the economy on 6th March (incl. recap of 2024's performance & 2025 growth projection)



Xi Jinping meets with national political advisors²⁾ of the CPPCC on 6th March



Press conference on foreign policy and external relations on 7th March by Wang Yi



Review of the draft amendment to the law on deputies to the NPC & local people's congresses on 7th March



Xi meets delegation of PLA & PAP (People's Armed Police Force) on 7th March



NPC SC Chairman **Zhao Leji** presents the **NPC SC's work report** on 8th March



SPC President Zhang
Jun presents the
Supreme People's
Court's work report
on 8th March



SPP Procurator-General Ying Yong presents the Supreme People's Procuratorate's work report on 8th March



Press conference on "people's livelihood" on 9th March



NPC aggregate view '21-'25: increasing policy focus on "NQPF", non-state economy and addressing key risks

NPC core policy program of the 14th FYP

Evolving policy focus of NPCs 2021-2025

Structural transitions	Key policy pillars per transition	NPC 2021	NPC 2022	NPC 2023	NPC 2024	NPC 2025
Polity and economic governance capacity	Public finance & tax reform	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Declining importance	Gaining importance	Steady implementation
	SOE reform	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation
	POE equal treatment	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Gaining importance
	Building unified market	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Declining importance	Gaining importance	Steady implementation
	Improving market governance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Declining importance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation
	Industrial upgrading (NQPF)	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Gaining importance
Economic transition	S&T innovation (NQPF)	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Gaining importance
	Green transition	Steady implementation				
Domestic demand	Consumption boost	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Declining importance	Gaining importance
expansion	Making effective investment	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance
	FDI promotion & foreign business envir.	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Gaining importance	Gaining importance
Economic	Stable trade activities	Steady implementation				
globalization	Trade diplomacy & BRI	Steady implementation				
	Engaging global economic governance	Steady implementation				
	Rural revitalization	Gaining importance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation
Optimizing social	People-centered urbanization	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Steady implementation
outcomes	Balanced regional development	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Declining importance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation
	Improving people's livelihood	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance
"Coordinate development and security"	Financial risk prevention	Steady implementation				
	Restoring real estate market	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Gaining importance	Gaining importance
	Addressing local debt burden	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Gaining importance	Gaining importance
	Food/energy/resource security	Steady implementation				
	Supply-chain resilience	Gaining importance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation
	Technological self-reliance	Gaining importance	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation	Steady implementation

Policy priorities: "re-selected" domestic demand expansion as top priority – first time since end of pandemic

Key observations on policy priorities in 2025 Government Work Report (GWR)

Key findings

geopolitical view due to

Trump 2.0

 Closely follow the high-level policy trajectory set by 20th Party Congress and Third Plenum, with New reform package CCP ideology Tone fundamental goals to solidly pursue "High-quality development" and deepening reforms being onboard · Newly stressed policy Working Pursuing progress while ensuring stability (稳中求进), systemic policy design and coordinated policy timing and thoroughness principle implementation, timely and thorough policy making to ensure effectiveness **Domestic** Adjusted from No.2 priority in 2024 to No.1 in 2025, primarily focused on consumption boost by enhancing Top gov priority switched demand consumer purchasing power, easier access to quality goods/service, improving consumption environment to domestic demand, driven by weak demand- Adjusted from No.1 priority in 2024 to No.2 in 2025, consistently focusing on innovation-driven industrial **NQPF** dragged economy and upgrading in terms of "traditional vs emerging vs future industries" by enhancing innovation ecosystem **Economic policy** anticipated external Reaffirmed to treat different ownership forms more equally; stressed to solve POEs' practical problems Market demand shock by tariffs economy Continue building unified market, breaking market segregation; anti-"involution" (反内卷) While China's industrial Public finance Promote "zero-base budget (零基预算)" reform ambitions unlikely to be & tax reform Increase financial autonomy of local governments by broadening local revenue sources scaled back, it increases Trade: targeted at stabilizing trade activities, trade of service as new growth driver challenges to Beijing in Opening up • FDI: open up more sectors, encourage reinvestment by FIEs, ensure equal treatment to FIEs balancing policy resource investment to **Economic** Continued efforts to restore property market, address local debt burden, and prevent systemic financial risks demand vs supply side security Less emphasis on supply-chain resilience **Urban-rural** • Urbanization: promote residency-based public service provision; launch new urban renewal programs Increasing policy effort Social development Rural revitalization: secure the outcome of poverty alleviation campaign; reform rural economic system devoted to improve people's livelihood, also People's Ensure job creation and labor protection; reform income distribution into being "skill-oriented (技能导向)" to support consumption Develop pro-childbirth policy package, including to issue "childcare subsidy (育儿补贴)" livelihood External Increasingly complex and unfriendly external environment that could bring bigger shocks to trade activities Foreign More pessimistic and technological advancement of China environment

Foreign

affairs

• Firmly oppose separationist forces in Taiwan and counter foreign interference with Taiwan

Oppose all forms of hegemonism and "power politics (强权政治)", as well as unilateralism and protectionism

Deep-dive 1: China's "domestic demand expansion" plan is centered on boosting household consumption

Key NPC 2025 policymaking on "domestic demand expansion" across 6 pillars

CMG assessment

(1(Ensure job creations and increase household income

- Plan to create 12M jobs and maintain 5.5% unemployment rate in urban areas
- Ensure salary growth standard/mechanism for labor workers (middle-and-low income)

(2) Broaden social safety net and enhance public service provision

- More fiscal resource planned to be spent on improving people's livelihood incl. education, healthcare, affordable housing, childcare, elderly care, etc.
- Promote residency-based public service provision, incl. ensuring social security of (qualified) rural immigrants and securing education opportunities for their children

(3) Increase consumer access to better goods & service

- Continued "trade-in" program for consumer goods, scope expanding to cover electronic products (besides home appliances) since 2025, with 300M RMB new subsidy issued since Feb
- Increase supply of esp. healthcare, elderly-care, child-care and housekeeping service, promised with easier market access and streamlined administration
- Release consumption potential of cultural products (e.g. movie, gaming), tourism, and sports, esp. by optimizing public holiday planning and ensuring annual leaves of employees

(4) Improve consumption environment

- Build big cities into international consumption centers, incl. more duty-free policy and encouraging traveler spending; improve suburban (e.g. towns) commercial facilities
- Build a consumption-oriented statistics system to track consumer spending activities
- Stricter market governance (e.g. on product quality) and consumer right protection

(5) Increase public investment

- Increase public investment oriented by "national development strategy" (e.g. to close the 14th FYP key projects) and people's livelihood (e.g. urban renewal program, affordable housing)
- Streamline the investment approval, enhance cross-ministerial and cross-regional coordination

(6) Support and encourage private investment

• Selectively open public projects in infrastructure (incl. key S&T facilities) to private investment

- China's weak household demand is rooted from structural issues (e.g. income inequality, lacking social security), only exacerbated by cyclical shocks (e.g. Covid); therefore, while short-term stimulus may help, structural efforts are more fundamentally needed to solve the root problems and thus transit China into a consumption-driven economy
- ... in the 2025 NPC, there is a good sign of China's integrating structural solutions in its consumption-boost approach: (1) enhance consumer's purchasing power by raising income and easing livelihood burden; (2) make consumer easier to access better goods and services esp. with service consumption as new growth driver; (3) improve environment, consolidating resources into big city centers and suburban hubs, to scale up the spending
- An updated statistical metric could help reiterate local officials' KPI into consumption focus, and thus incentivize pro-consumption policy implementation
- Investment activities remain government-led, with a growing fiscal focus on social projects like affordable housing and urban renewal
- Good sign detected that investment barrier is being relaxed for private investment, but this likely will be proceeded only in a gradual pace

Source: CMG analysis based on Premier's government work report



Consumption

boost

Effective

investment

making

Deep-dive 2: fostering "new-quality productive forces" as core approach to realize China's industrial ambition

Key NPC 2025 policymaking on "new-quality productive forces" across 6 pillars

CMG assessment

Industrial upgrading

(1) Upgrade traditional industries with innovation output

- Apply new tech solutions or deploy new equipment in traditional industries, to increase productivity or energy efficiency, esp. accelerate digitalization of manufacturing
- (2) Promote development of emerging industries
- Focus on large-scale application and rolling-out (推广) of new products/techs; safety and heathy development are emphasized specifically for commercial aerospace and low-altitude economy
- (3) Explore early investment to future industries
- Build up an "investment-growth mechanism (未来产业投入增长机制)"
- Explicitly listed industries to explore: 6G, biomanufacturing, embodied intelligence, quantum

S&T innovation

(4) Build up high-quality education system

- Reform the education system to serve NQPF development, notably to improve disciplinary setting in universities and promote industrial practices in vocational schools
- (5) Pursue "high-level technological self-reliance (高水平科技自立自强)"
- Continue to enhance public research capabilities e.g. national labs
- Enterprises to play bigger roles in leading the industry-university-research (产学研) integration, to engage with S&T innovation policy making (promised with "institutional guarantee (制度保障)"), and to contribute to national S&T projects
- Proceed the reforms for promoting transfer of research outcomes (成果转化) e.g. allowing public researchers to transact their IP to market entities
- Create a pro-exploration and failure-tolerant sentiment for innovators

Overcapacity issue

(6) Manage industrial overcapacity

 (Specifically in emerging industries), optimize the planning on new industrial capacity building, and strengthen the monitoring on capacity utilization of existing industrial facilities, in order to promote "orderly development (有序发展) and positive competition (良性竞争)" of the market

- China's core approach to foster innovation (or NQPF) focuses on enhancing an innovation ecosystem through seamless value creation among three actors: talent suppliers (universities), tech inventors (universities/research institutes) and tech applicants (industrial players)
- ... a critical mechanism in this process is the
 "transfer of research outcome", which helps bridge
 the gap between tech inventors and tech applicants,
 ensuring innovations' move from the labs to real case applications; In recent years, China has
 launched pilot programs to refine this process and is
 expected to roll out successful models (e.g. SJTU's
 case) nationwide since 2025 (or 15th FYP)
- Enterprises are increasingly encouraged by policy makers to lead the integrated value creation, which is expected to make China's innovation exercise more problem-solving-oriented, aligning tech advancement with real market needs
- New investments in sectors with overcapacity issue (particularly in emerging industries e.g. solar, batteries, NEVs) are likely to be restricted, and policymakers may introduce quota-based production management on OEMs to prevent excessive expansion and stabilize the market

Source: CMG analysis based on Premier's government work report



Deep-dive 3: better treatment is promised to "non-state economy", "involution" seen as a market issue

Key NPC 2025 policymaking on "non-state economy" and "business environment" across 7 pillars

CMG assessment

Private business support

(1) Enhance legal protection of POEs

Firmly protect the legal rights of POEs and entrepreneurs

(2) Solve POEs' practical problems

- Clear the unpayment by (local) governments to POEs
- Enhance the dialogue between governments and POEs, and help address the practical challenges
- Regulate the administrative interference to POEs, esp. cease the no-reason punishment, charging, investigation or shut-down order

FDI promotion

(3) Open up more sectors to foreign business

- Expand pilots of opening up service sector (with Beijing as a flagship demonstration zone), esp. telecommunication, medical service, education
- Gradually relax market access to internet and cultural areas

(4) Foster FIEs' integration into local ecosystem

• Encourage FIEs in China to reinvest in China with retained earnings, esp. for integrating into local supply-chain / value-chain

(5) Equal treatment

 Firmly ensure equal treatment to FIEs in terms of access to factors of production (most prominently seen in financing), qualification & licensing, standard-setting and engagement with public procurement (e.g. define "made-in-China" products)

General business environment

(6) Unified market building

- Eliminate local protectionism and market segregation, and remove barriers for businesses to enter or exit the market e.g. with new market access "negative list"
- Create a unified transportation market and reduce overall logistics cost

(7) Market governance

- Comprehensively govern/regulate the "involution" type of competition
- Create a compliance guideline on fair competition (or anti-monopoly) in key areas
- · Continue improving the social credit system, esp. create channel to repair the damaged credit

- The NPC largely aligns with the Third Plenum's policy trajectory of ensuring more equal treatment to all ownership forms and improving overall business environment, but NPC seeming featured with higher focus on practical problem-solving
- …such practical mindset was also evident in President Xi's Feb symposium with entrepreneurs, where he discussed a lot of practical issues and called for "resolute implementation (坚决执行)" of POE support policies made by the central gov
- ... the signals may suggest that the push for equal treatment and private business environment improvement is moving from policy rhetoric to concrete on-the-ground actions
- Curbing "involution" by cracking down excessive competitions is now seen by Beijing as part of its broader market governance efforts, alongside antimonopoly measures; however, the root causes of involution are structural, including e.g. sloweddown growth in total factor productivity (TFP), output-driven KPIs of local officials, imbalanced regional development, etc.; addressing such issues goes beyond market governance and requires longterm structural reforms to create a more sustainable and innovation-driven economic growth

Noteworthy policy articulations: Li Qiang introduced new policy concepts and Xi visited NPC Jiangsu delegates

New policy concepts in Gov Work Report

Xi's speech at Two Sessions

Economic leaders' messaging



Premier Li Qiang presenting the Government Work Report (GWR) to the NPC (Mar 5)

- "New-type offshore trade (新型离岸贸易)": a trade form without going China custom, some de-tariffing
- "Zero-based budget reform (零基预算)": a budget planning without constraint from budget history
- "Investing in people (投资于人)": skewed resource allocation to serve people's livelihood
- "Skill-oriented income distribution (技能导向薪酬分配)": increase income of hard workers, skilled workers and innovative talents
- "Anti-involution (反内卷)": reduce excessive competition among market entities and local govs
- "Gradual risk-mitigation amid development (在发展中逐步化解风险): tone-setting that development as the primary policy goal compared to "de-risking"



President Xi Jinping visited Jiangsu delegates, CPPCC Education Panel, and PLA & PAP delegates (Mar 5-7)

- Economic powerhouse regions are expected to shoulder more responsibilities in helping and leading the execution of China's development strategies and implementation of reform plans
- The education system should serve China's strategic need of cultivating high-tech talents and pursuing tech advancement, and the education system reform focus lie in industry-university-research integration and application-oriented transfer of research outcome
- China sticks to the principle of building its military capabilities in a cost-effective way, and stronger oversight is needed in military's operation to fight against the corruptions



Economic leadership (Heads of NDRC, PBOC, MOF, MOFCOM, CSRC) at press conference (Mar 6)

- A consumption-boost action plan to be released soon
- New government-guided venture fund to be launched
- Selective public projects in infrastructure areas (incl. railway, nuclear power, water conservancy, key S&T facilities) will be open to private investment
- Besides record-high fiscal deficit target, fiscal spending expansion and bond issuance, China will increase transfer payment for enhancing local fiscal capabilities
- While goods consumption is suppressed by weak demand, the service consumption is dragged by lack of high-quality supply
- Trade of service is next driver of China's trade growth
- China will accelerate the improvement of public service provision for rural immigrants in cities



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


Macroeconomic policy: in line with CEWC 2024, signaling strong monetary easing and fiscal expansion

Lenses	NPC policy targets and key measures	CMG assessment		
Growth and economic target	 GDP growth target: around 5%, same to 2024 Unemployment rate in urban area: around 5.5%, same to 2024 Consumer Price Index (CPI): to growt around 2%, compared to 3% in 2024 Household income: growth kept in line with GDP growth, same to 2024 	 Beijing "admits" the difficulty in getting 5% growth, esp. given the deteriorating tariff environment, so economic policy will focus on domestic demand expansion to compensate for possible export loss A more realistic CPI target setting shows Beijing's being aware of China's deflationary pressure, given 2024 CPI growing only 0.2% 		
Monetary easing	 Further cut (as a continuation since H2 2024) of policy interest rate and Reserve Requirement Ratio at proper timing Take good use of innovative monetary tools (e.g. stock market swap tool) in supporting property, stock market, high-tech, consumption, etc. RMB exchange rate to be maintained at a generally stable level 	 Low-interest environment likely to sustain throughout the year to counter the heightened deflationary pressure, enabling easier financing for business and capital market RMB exchange rate potentially under appreciation pressure due Trump's endeavor to weaken USD, but Beijing's goal is to stabilize 		
Fiscal expansion	 Historically highest deficit target by Chinese government—4% of GDP 29.7T-RMB fiscal spending planned, expanding 1.2T compared to 2024 Planned to issue total 1.8T RMB special treasury bond Planned to issue 4.4T RMB SPBs for local governments to purchase land/properties and clear unpayment to enterprises 	 Confirmed c.a. 2.9T RMB fiscal expansion compared to 2024, the expanded spending to be allocated primarily to key areas listed in GWR incl. consumption, people's livelihood, urban renewal, etc. Likely to see faster materialization of fiscal expansion than previously, effectiveness of "stimulus" likely to be evaluated in Q2 		
Demand boosting	 Continued "trade-in" program for consumer goods, with 300M RMB Ultra-long special treasure bond issued as subsidy Optimized public holiday planning (2 extra days are added in 2025) Continued industrial equipment upgrading program; 735M RMB central government investment scheme, increased 35M compared to 2024 	 The NPC 2025 has made a clear consumption-centered policy focus, China needs to rely on extraordinary growth in consumption to reach the 5% GDP growth Besides the ongoing "trade-in" grogram, more measure likely to be introduced on service consumption e.g. entertainment, tourism 		
Real estate restoration	 To adjust property transaction restrictions on a city-specific basis "Add more efforts" to proceed urban renewal programs More support given and autonomy granted for local government in purchasing inventory properties for affordable housing 	 Purchase restrictions could be further relaxed in tier-1 cities (Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen as the last few cities with restrictions) Priority set to avoid any sharp declines in asset price, and ideally to reverse the negative growth of property sales into positive 		



Fiscal budget: 4.4% growth expected in 2025 with S&T, debt, FA&D & education as key growth categories



Insights into 2025 budget

General observations:

- Higher budget increase of 4.4% expected (vs. 3.7% in 2024) and thus in close vicinity of real GDP growth target of ~5.0%
- **Budget deficit of 4%** expected by Government and thus significant increase compared to previous years' "deficit red line" values of 3%
- Moreover, China will issue total 1.8T CNY of special treasury bonds, plus 4.4T CNY of local gov. specialpurpose bonds (SPB); thus total fiscal stimulus might reach ~9-10% of GDP

Key budget growth categories:

- S&T, FA&D, debt and education expected to have largest budget increase in 2025 YoY
- **S&T** with largest increase at now 8.3% to further strengthen "new-quality productive forces"
- Despite increase of 7.7%, debt servicing grew underproportional compared to 2024 (8.9%)
- FA&P budget to grow by 7.2% and signals continuous prioritization of military spending
- Education with largest annual growth rate increase in 2025 (6.1% vs 2.0%) which also quantifies heightened government focus on national education system
- In contrast, past year's key growth categories Culture, tourism & leisure as well as Agriculture (both 12.8% in 2024) with limited growth in 2025 (2.4% & 0.2%))



1 basic law amended during NPC 2025, laws with focus on financial topics enacted in 2024 by NPC SC key for FIEs

Law on the Representation of **National People's Congresses** (Amendment)

- Pass: 11.03.2025 (NPC)
- Key change: New formulations to underline the adherence to the party's overall leadership

Emergency Response Law (Revision)

- Pass: 28.06.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Streamlining of emergency reporting process and general data privacy & protection of citizens

Government & Legal Process Statistics Law (Amendment)

- Pass: 13.09.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Explicit **prohibition** for government bodies & officials to report false or instruct to alter data

Law on Oversight by SC of People's Congresses (Rev.)

- Pass: 08.11.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Key change**: Granting additional oversight tools and follow-up measures to People's Congresses

Supervision Law (Amendment)

- Pass: 25.12.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Key change**: Expansion of powers of the supervision commissions ("liuzhi" or Retention in Custody (RIC))

Public Health

Border Health & Quarantine Law (Revision)

- Pass: 28.06.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Key change**: New chapter regarding "emergency management" which grants SC a series of crisisresponse measures

Education

Degree Law (New)

- Pass: 26.04.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Summary**: Framework law to standardize the academic system, the conferral of degrees and the rights of degree applicants & owners

National Defense Education Law (Revision)

- Pass: 13.09.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: New definition of national defense education and its core part "patriotic education"

Pre-school Education Law (New)

- Pass: 08.11.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Summary**: Implementation of nation-wide pre-school education system (with focus on adhesion to CCP)

Energy

Energy Law (New)

- Pass: 08.11.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Summary: Promotion of** high-quality energy and guarantee of national energy security (focus on green transformation)

Agriculture

Rural Collective Economic Organizations Law (New)

- Pass: 28.06.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Summary**: Standardization of operations & management of applicable organizations & members

Science

S&T Popularization Law (Revision)

- Pass: 25.12.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Designation of September as annual national science popularization month to boost public participation

Tariffs & Taxation

Tariff Law (New)

- Pass: 26.04.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Summary: Establishment** of tariff commission; regulation of collection and payment of tariffs; definition of tariff items & applicable tax rates

Value-Added Tax Law (New)

- Pass: 25.12.2024 (NPC SC)
- **Summary: Definition of** taxable transactions & VAT tax rates and standardization of VAT collection

Finance

Accounting Law (Amendment)

- Pass: 28.06.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Addition & push for digitalized accounting documents & tools (e.g. e-fapiao as well as invoices)

Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Law (Revision)

- Pass: 08.11.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Expansion of **AML scope** to include new schemes; increase AML obligations for financial institutions

Environment

Cultural Relics Protection Law (Revision)

- Pass: 08.11.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Request to stronger protect, inspect & acknowledge cultural relics (incl. higher fines for misconduct)

Mineral Resources Law (Revision)

- Pass: 08.11.2024 (NPC SC)
- Key change: Push to extend reserves of strategic minerals and to boost production capacity



Laws adopted by NPC (others by NPC-SC)

Laws important for foreign business



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Key take-aways for foreign business

- Last NPC during 14th Five-Year-Plan period (2021-2025) and the first NPC after the latest reform package was endorsed by the "Third Plenum"
 - In general, NPC largely follows the policy trajectory of the "Third Plenum" and the CEWC 2024, no surprising policy signals detected
- Policy priority change: domestic demand expansion is brought back to the top priority, first time after the end of Covid
 - The priority change is largely driven by (1) China's domestic economy being dragged by weak domestic demand and accompanied deflationary pressure since 2024, and (2) anticipated external demand shock due to geoeconomic disruptions like deteriorating tariff environment
 - Top policy priority setting by NPC swinging between demand-side vs supply-side (NQPF, industrial upgrading) since post Covid; while Beijing wants to prioritize restoring the demand side this year, its industrial ambition is unlikely to be sacrificed, the situation adds challenges to Beijing in balancing policy resource investment to demand vs supply side
- **Demand side**: policy efforts are centered on consumption boost, and notably a good sign that besides continuing short-term interventions (e.g. fiscal subsidies on "trade-in" programs for cons), China touches more structural approach to address the root issues that suppress household consumption e.g. imbalanced income distribution, social insecurity, less favorable consumption environment, etc.
- **Supply side**: in line with NPC 2024 and Third Plenum, notably seeming a stronger push to enhance the innovation ecosystem through integrated value creation among industry-university-research, and enterprises are increasingly encouraged by policy makers to lead such integrated value creation
- **POE and FIE treatment**: largely aligns with the Third Plenum's policy trajectory of ensuring more equal treatment to all ownership forms and improving overall business environment
- Anti-"involution": seen by Beijing as part of market governance efforts; however, the root causes of involution are deeply structural, including e.g. slow TFP growth, output-driven government KPIs, etc.; addressing such issues goes beyond market regulation and requires long-term structural efforts
- Macroeconomy: monetary easing and fiscal expansion in implementation, China needs to rely on extraordinary consumption growth to reach 5% growth target



Anticipating China's annual calendar: monitoring key events/meetings until end 2025

	2025 Q1	2025 Q2	2025 Q3	2025 Q4	
Top-level party events: CC	The 4th Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee				
Top lovel neutranectings		Politburo Standing Committee Me	etings (principally held every week)		
Top-level party meetings: PB / PBSC		Politburo Meetings (principally held every month)			
10/1030		'Beidaihe' leadership Conclave			
Nop-level party	Central Financial Commission (CFC) Central Financial and Economic Affairs	CFEAC (Apr)	CFEAC (Sep)	CEWC 2025 (Dec)	
commissions (focus on economy/finance	Commission (CFEAC)				
and reforms)	Meetings	of Central Comprehensively Deepening Reforms	Commission (CCDRC), held irregularly through	out the year	
	"Two Sessions": NPC+CPPCC (Mar)	Ambassadorial conference (Jun)			
Top-level gov. meetings	Weekly executive meetings of the State Council (usually on Wednesday)				
	Bi-monthly meetings of the NPC Standing Committee (usually late in even-numbered months)				
	Germany elections (Feb)	Shangri-la Dialogue 2025 (June)	UN GA (Sep)	47 th ASEAN summit Malaysia (Oct/Nov)	
	WEF 2025 (Jan)	46 th ASEAN summit Malaysia (April/May)		COP30 Conference Brazil (Nov)	
	Munich Security Conference (Feb)	Russia celebrates WW II victory (May)		G20 in South Africa (Nov)	
Foreign affairs milestones	China Development Forum	G7 Summit in Canada (Jun)		Singapore general elections	
	Bo'ao Forum 2025 (Mar)	NATO Summit in the Netherlands (Jun)		APEC 2025 in South Korea	
	President Trump sworn in (Jan)				
Key trade Fairs			China International Fair for Trade in Services 2025	CIIE (Import Expo) 2025 SH (Nov)	
Economic data releases	Monthly: PMI, trade, CPI/PPI, ind. production, FAI, retail sales / Quarterly: GDP, current account, PBoC monetary policy committee (MPC) meeting				
Other key events					



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2025 webinar series: China's 15th FYP: building towards next milestone in 2035 under unabating geopolitical pressure



Confirmed

Dealing with Trump 2.0 – is China making tactical or strategic adjustments in view of the 15th FYP?

DA Wei, Director of Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and Professor of International Relations, Tsinghua University

26 February 2025 9-945am CET | 4-445pm CST



Currently inquiring / TBC

China-EU relations – ingredient or impediment to aid China's development until 2030

CAI Run, Ambassador of PRC Delegation to the European Union (EU)

September 2025 9-945am CEST | 3-345pm CST



Confirmed / exact date TBD

Four years into 14th FYP – taking stock of its execution after the NPC 2025

ZHU Guangyao, former Vice-Minister of Finance and Counsellor of the State Council

23 April 2025 9-945am CEST | 3-345pm CST



Confirmed / exact date TBD

"Reality check" – interpreting the "15th FYP outline" as per the 20th CC 5th Plenum and anticipating shifts

BAI Chong-En, Dean of School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University

November 2025 9-945am CET | 4-445pm CST



Confirmed / exact date TBD

The long view – 10-year outlook imagining China in 2035 as the next key modernization milestone

YU Yongding, Academician of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and Member of Advisory Committees of NDRC and MFA

June 2025 9-945am CEST | 3-345pm CST



Confirmed / exact date TBD

Transitioning to the 15th FYP – zooming-in on Shenzhen as local government case-study

ZHANG Lin, Director of Science, Technology and Innovation Commission of Shenzhen Municipality

December 2025 9-945am CET | 4-445pm CST

Anchor partner







Key publication series: CMG Primers

Understanding the "Taiwan issue" – context, influencing factors and outlook

Chinese government remodeled at the Two Sessions 2023 – policy, people and structure Understanding supply chain distortions of critical minerals powering the green energy transition

Xi's third 'Third Plenum' pivots to implementation, doubling down on China's industrial ambition

Caixin Summit 2024 - CMG's analytical digest: slide deck and read-out webinar recording












Understanding process and key outcomes of China's 20th Party Congress




Understanding process and influencing factors of Taiwan's 2024 presidential election



Two Sessions 2024 – Strengthening proactive and better coordinated economic policy



EU-China relations – from economic integration to EU's strategic autonomy and 'de-risking'



Understanding China's economy into 2025 – evolved development strategy, reform priorities and short-term macroeconomic management





2025 ECCS, taking place 9-12 November 2025 in Shenzhen – "travel with us to Shenzhen!"



9-12 November 2025

2025 Europe-China Conference Shenzhen (ECCS)

China's evolving policy and business context for European strategic decision-making ahead of the 15th FYP (2026-2030)

Reservation



<u>Reference</u>: 2023 "Re-Engaging with China – Business Opportunities and Challenges" program

22nd October / «Day 1» Sunday

1) Shenzhen sightseeing

GAO Yan 高岩

(Ass. Professor of Architecture. University of Hong Kong)



2) Welcome addresses

Toni Schönenberger, stars

Klaus Zenkel, EUCCC

Markus Herrmann, CMG

Zhang Lin 张林, Director Shenzhen **S&T Innovation Committee**



3) China's demographic challenges

PENG Wensheng 彭文生 (Chief Economist, CICC)



4) Opening keynote speech


XIAO Geng 肖耿


(Founding Director of Tsinghua Brookings program)




5) Post-Covid - Reconnecting with world?

Philippe Praz







6) Economy – Recovery or Recession?

WANG Dan 王丹

(Chief Economist, Hang Seng Bank)



WANG Yong 王勇 (Ass. Prof. of Economy, PKU)

7) Venture capital / Shenzhen's ecosystem

Chen Mo 陈默

(Director, Dept of Funds and PM, Shenzhen Angel FOF)



8) Engineering meets Entrepreneurship

LIU Hongjie 刘洪杰

(Founder Reexen, Al processors and chips)



Kathy GONG 龚晓思

(Co=founder Stealth Startup and WafaGames)



ZHU Hong 朱虹

(Co-founder of Enabot)



9) Site visits I & II

Tencent Ping'an

Tencent 腾讯 中国平安 **PING AN**

10) Evening address

Ivan Gonzalez

(Swiss Re CEO Reinsurance China and China Country President)



24th October / «Day 3»

Tuesday

11) Daring to win – BASF's Mega-Investm.

Jörg Wuttke

(ex President EUCCC, BASF China Rep)



12) Being strategic in China

Matilda Ho


(Serial Entrepreneur and Investor)




13) Foreign business sentiment

Francine Hadjisotiriou-Tersiguel

(GM - South China at EUCCC)



(Group Chief Risk Officer at AIA)



(Head External Alliance, China Innovation Center at Roche)



14) Site visit III

Shenzhen Stock Exchange

15) Journalists@dinner

FANG Kecheng

ZHENG Wei

(Assistant Professor of Journalism and



Communication, CUHK)

(Senior Correspondent, SCMP)



19) A conversation with Dr. Uli Sigg

Uli Sigg

(Art Collector, Former Swiss Ambassador to China)

25th October / «Day 4»

Wednesday

16) BRI After 10 Years Zhang Jianyu 张建宇

(Executive Director, BRI Green

Development Institute, Beijing)

(Professor, Chinese University of

(President AmCham South China)

(Head of Trade Section of the EU

18) Navigating a more multipolar world

17) China's foreign policy

HAO Yufan 郝雨凡

HAO Yufan 郝雨凡

Marjut Hannonen

Delegation to the PRC)

Harley Seyedin

Hong Kong, Shenzhen)




20) M+ alumni event

Visit of M+ museum in Hong Kong





WEF Horizon Scan: Corporate strategy-making in China, six building blocks





CMG services: overview of four key service types, corresponding credentials available upon request

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