

"We are in a period where strategic opportunities and challenges coexist and uncertainties are increasing, but with solid resilience and growth potential in economy, the positive trajectory of China's long-term development remains unchanged"

--- The Communique of Fourth Plenum of CCP 20<sup>th</sup> Central Committee

# "Fourth Plenum": towards more assertively shaping strategic conditions externally to better focus on "Chinese-style modernization" internally

CMG Primer – understanding process and key outcomes of the CCP 20th Central Committee's "Fourth Plenum"

### 6th November 2025

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China Macro Group (CMG)

# China Macro Group (CMG) – a specialized European management consulting and research firm



### **Profile**

- cMG is an agile, service-minded and innovative management consulting and research firm
- CMG serves European corporate, investment and public sectors on China related questions
- It specializes in aiding strategic decision-making of governance and executive bodies
- CMG contributes content publicly via various initiatives such as Primers and webinars
- CMG operates with presences in Zurich, Munich and Beijing

# Our approach

### **Cross-cultural epistemic**

Team dialectics, socio-economic grounded China analysis and accountable also to Chinese discourse

### **Interdisciplinarity**

Business management / strategy, public policy, macroeconomy and geopolitics / geoeconomics

### "Multipolar" analytics

For geopolitical / geoeconomic analysis actively use or seek expertise and views from respective "pole"

### **Research values**

Original, fact-based and calibrated – plus extensive Chinese expert network


### **Professional services DNA**

Listening, ownership and co-creation as foundation to build trusted and tailored collaborations

# Our value proposition – 4 service areas

### Consulting

- Strategy devising / review
- China development scenarios
- HQ-subsidiary alignment





# **Briefing / intelligence**

- China's development strategy
- Strategic business context
- Market / competitive trends





### Monitoring

- Strategic business context
- Sector / market factors
- Geopolitical / risk factors





### Learning

- Learning conference / training
- Event / webinar moderation
- Speaker / expert referrals



























### CMG's mission

Accurately interpreting China's development strategy and analyzing its factual trajectory on macro, sector and market levels

to support **strategic decision-making** of European corporate, investment and public sectors with **original**, **fact-based and calibrated** research and strategic advice

thereby contributing to sustainable cooperation with China





# **Agenda**

- Reviewing the "Fourth Plenum" of the CCP's 20th Central Committee
  - Strategic context synopsis
  - Process, key scenic moments and 14<sup>th</sup> Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030) evaluation
  - "Proposition" (建议) formal analysis
  - "Proposition" (建议) policy substance analysis
- Proposed strategic considerations for European / international business

**CMG** services and resources



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# **Context**: "Plenum" takes place amid unstable economic recovery, accelerated reforms and US-China dealmaking

### **Economy: unstable post-Covid recovery**

# China's post-Covid quarterly GDP growth (YoY) 6.3% 5.2% 5.4% 5.2% 4.5% Initiated macroeconomic intervention 7.5% 1.5%

### · Overall recovery:

- Solid growth since macroeconomic interventions but new downward pressure in Q3 2025 and overall aggregate domestic demand restoring
- Manufacturing still facing deflationary pressure due to overcapacity – yet: the negative trend slowed
- "NQPF" contributing +4% to GDP in 2024 (vs. 2020)
- <u>Real estate</u>: ongoing market contraction (-10% GDP comparing 2024 to 2020), but demand recovering faster than new supply addition, positively signaling ongoing consumption of stock properties
- <u>Unemployment</u>: overall unemployment rate slightly dropped (0.5%) – youth segment still under pressure

### Policy: 1 year into "Third Plenum" decisions



CCP 20<sup>th</sup> Central Committee's Third Plenum set new reform plan—most comprehensive one since 2013 (Jul 18, 2024)

- Highlights of implementing "Third Plenum" decisions

   which in our view was held under the premise of
   Trump being re-elected over past year include:
  - <u>Equal treatment in public procurement</u>: Private Economy Promotion Law, defining "Made-in-China"
  - <u>"High-level" opening-up</u>: expanded scope of trialing high-quality international economic standards
  - "New-quality productive forces": more local-level implementation on supporting commercialization of public S&T research outcomes
- <u>"Anti-involution"</u>: regulated local gov investment promotion and capacity governance in key sectors
- Fertility: materialized fertility subsidy plan

### Foreign affairs: an active and assertive China



President XI Jinping walking side-by-side with Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong-un at China military parade (Sep 3, 2025)

### US-China

 China's retaliations to US decoupling and tariff actions using chokepoints (esp. REEs) shape deal exploration with Trump, leading to a temporary truce in form of a "trade deal" on 30<sup>th</sup> Oct.

### EU-China

Relationship deteriorating amid EU's persisting strategic (China's relationship with Russia) and broadening economic concerns (export controls, overcapacity, non level playing field)


### • Russia-China

 Deepening strategic cooperation and coordination in pluri-/multilateral formats (e.g. SCO, BRICS, UN)



# Until "growth crisis" mid-2024, China's policy focus lies on structural transition, tolerating a slower recovery

### China's quarterly GDP growth over the past 5 years







Economy Backup

# Intervention effectiveness: demand-side recovering positively, while supply-side negative trend being curbed


### **Demand-side indicators**



### Social Retail Sales (monthly YOY change in %)



### **Supply-side indicators**



### Manufacturing Purchasing Manager's Index (monthly YOY change in %)



\*Source: National Bureau of Statistics, CEIC Data

**Economy** Backup

# In third year of recovery, both short- and long-term efforts are made to tackle five biggest economic issues

Key economic issues	Status and trend to date	CMG view	Outlook
Insufficient domestic demand	<ul> <li>Dangerous signal of deflationary pressure detected in H1 2024</li> <li>Positive trend esp. since 2025, but net sustainability still uncertain</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Caused by Covid after-effect and "negative wealth effect" of real estate asset bubble burst</li> <li>Beyond short-term stimulate, more structural measures needed e.g. higher income jobs for middle class (via NQPF, replacing asset-backed wealth), subsidies to the poor, social security</li> <li>Biggest potential in service consumption, incl. entirely new demand e.g. "emotion economy"</li> </ul>	7
Industrial overcapacity	<ul> <li>Low capacity utilization rate plus "price war" in both traditional (e.g. cement) and in emerging sectors (e.g. EV, solar, battery)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Caused by mismatch between consistent industrial capacity expansion and weak demand—both globally and domestically—since Covid and real estate crisis</li> <li>Systemic "pro-supply" incentives for both local governments and business to expand supply</li> <li>Solutions: domestic demand expansion, capacity off-shoring, market governance incl. standard</li> </ul>	$\rightarrow$
Real estate crisis	<ul> <li>Slowing of negative trend seen earliest in 2023, but remains a drag to economy; stocks being consumed, but very gradually</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Real estate "rightsizing" is driven by social policy intent—"house is for living, not speculation"</li> <li>China could have be able to more smoothly address negative impact of "rightsizing", but Covid created a timing-wise unlucky demand shock</li> <li>10% GDP lost 2020-2024 compensated by 4% NQPF, 2% services, 1.6% net export and ~2% TFP</li> </ul>	7
Local debt burden	<ul> <li>Debt burden accumulated in past decade, esp. "hidden debt"</li> <li>Initial effectiveness of debt-swap is observed</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Caused by debt-based local investment—local revenue shortage as biggest issue</li> <li>Debt-swap program as short-term measure relieved some fiscal pressure of local governments, but more structural efforts needed for fiscal system reform</li> <li>China total debt level below G20 average; ~400T CNY state assets vs ~100T CNY total debt</li> </ul>	7
Unemployment	<ul> <li>Unemployment pressure since 2023, as an after-effect of Covid</li> <li>Overall stabilizing since 2025, but pressure in youth unemployment</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>4 labor-demanding areas: military (demand intact), agriculture (demand intact, absorbing some factory workers), factories (demand growth slowed), higher education (under demand)</li> <li>Dragging factors: slower economic growth, skill mismatch (lacking high-end and vocational)</li> <li>Solutions: job creation—NQPF, service, "going-out"; talent supply—high-end, vocational</li> </ul>	$\rightarrow$



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CMG services and resources



# Deviating from tradition, this time it is the "Fourth Plenum" deciding the "proposition" (建议) for the 15th FYP

### What is a "Fourth Plenum" in general?

### **Central Committee (CC)** (203 members + 171 alternate members) 1st Plenum Decide CCP's leadership 2nd Plenum Decide central gov.'s leadership **3rd Plenum** CC Define mid-term economic and customarily social reform goals holds 7 Different this time 4th Plenum plenary Implement 3rd plenum policy, partymeetings building and governance (usually) during each CC's 5-year Different this time 5th Plenum term Evaluate social and economic dev., initiate new FYPs (usually) 6th Plenum Steer ideological setting and party building 7th Plenum **Prepare next CCP National Congress**

### What is different about this "Fourth Plenum"?

# Participants: 315 CC members and alternate members **Overview** Advance agenda: Fourth Plenum takes over Fifth Plenum agenda 1 year later: Oct. 20-23, 2025, 3 years after the First Plenum of **Timing** 20th CC -> in 19th CC, it was 2 years after the First Plenum "Proposition" (建议): Proposition of CC CCP on Formulation of the 15th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development (Draft for Discussion) Output Personnel decisions: plenary voting on personnel punishment and announcement of personnel replacement

Fourth Plenum has moved forward the usual Fifth Plenum's function of shaping the next Five-Year Plan, mostly because the delayed Third Plenum

### How does "Fourth Plenum" define 15th FYP?

Fourth Plenum

Fourth Plenum approves **the Proposition** (建议), which sets up **principles** & guidance of 15th FYP



STATE COUNCIL 国务院 State Council will take the "Proposition" and prepare the Draft Outline (草案) of 15th FYP, within 3-4 months after "the proposition"



中共中央政治局会议

Politburo will discuss and review the Draft Outline (草案) around January to February 2026





National People's Congress (NPC) will deliberate and approve the final 15th FYP in March 2026



# Key scenic moments: "Fourth Plenum" unfolds over four days, with two key speeches delivered by Xi Jinping



XI Jinping, followed by Li Qiang, Zhao Leji, Wang Huning, etc. entering the **Opening Ceremony** 



**168** CC members, **147** CC alternate members, CCDI SC members and grassroot delegates, **attending Plenum** 



XI Jinping delivering the work report entrusted by the Politburo at the beginning of "Fourth Plenum"



Attendees of the "Fourth Plenum" deliberating and passing "the proposition" for the 15th FYP



XI Jinping delivering a speech as (verbal) **"explanation"** (说明) of the "**proposition**" (建议) for the 15th FYP



Deliberation and passing of CCDI's and CMC's punishment decisions to **expel** 14 people from the CCP



Closing of the "Fourth Plenum" with all participants standing and playing L'Internationale



**Press Conference** on 24th October by select senior CCP politicians and selective ministers of government

# 14<sup>th</sup> FYP evaluation: NDRC and Xinhua summarize 14<sup>th</sup> FYP achievements, citing evidence across 9 dimensions

Policy dimension	Key issues and 14 <sup>th</sup> FYP policymaking	Key progress metric evidence cited	CMG assessment
Modern industrial system	<ul> <li>Issues: limited high-end industries, slow TFP growth</li> <li>Policy: innovation-driven industrial upgrading</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>High-tech manufacturing growing 8.7% yearly, outpacing 6.7% growth of overall manufacturing</li> </ul>	Well progressed
High-tech innovation	<ul><li>Issues: high-tech bottleneck</li><li>Policy: new system to mobilize national resources</li></ul>	<ul> <li>R&amp;D intensity from 2.4% in 2020 to 2.68% in 2024, closing to OECD average 2.7%</li> </ul>	Well progressed
Domestic demand and consumption	<ul> <li>Issues: weak consumption, low labor income</li> <li>Policy: domestic demand expansion</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Final consumption in average contributes 60% GDP,</li> <li>11 p.p. up than 13<sup>th</sup> FYP average</li> </ul>	Well progressed
Deepening reform	<ul> <li>Issues: market protection, discrimination, disorder</li> <li>Policy: unified market, POE support, governance</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Market access negative list shortened 30+%</li> <li>Cleared 4218 rules that violated fair competition</li> </ul>	Well progressed
High-level opening-up	<ul> <li>Issues: increasing geoeconomic disruptions</li> <li>Policy: broadening opening-up esp. to non-US</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Cleared FDI restrictions in manufacturing sectors</li> <li>Zero-tariff treatment to least developed economies</li> </ul>	Well progressed
Coordinated regional and urban-rural development	<ul><li>Issues: regional and urban-rual disparity</li><li>Policy: metropolitan clustering, rural revitalization</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Tailored development strategy to different regions</li> <li>Urban-rural income gap from 2.56/1 to 2.34/1</li> </ul>	Well progressed
Welfare and social policy	<ul> <li>Issues: aging, unemployment, public service access</li> <li>Policy: fertility support, enhancing social security</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Average life expectancy up 1.1 to 79 years old</li> <li>Basic insurance participation maintained &gt; 95%</li> </ul>	<b>Lagging</b> (Fertility support lagging)
Environmental sustainability	<ul> <li>Issues: economic reliance on high-emission sectors</li> <li>Policy: energy transition, green finance</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Energy consumption per GDP unit declined 11.6%</li> <li>87% days of good air quality, 3 p.p. up than 13<sup>th</sup> FYP</li> </ul>	<b>Lagging</b> (Reduction in energy consumption lagging)
National security	<ul> <li>Issues: fragility of critical supply, financial risk</li> <li>Policy: holistic national security, resilience building</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Built over 1 billion mu of high-standard farmland</li> <li>China contributes 1/3 world total power generation</li> </ul>	Well progressed

<sup>\*</sup>Note:  $14^{th}$  FYP progress check is based on comparing all  $14^{th}$  FYP official targets with the reported achievements, then a CMG assessment



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# "Fourth Plenum" frames external environment and China's agency very differently from "Fifth Plenum" (2020)


<u>Dimension</u>	"Proposition" (建议) of "Fifth Plenum" – Oct. 2020	"Proposition" (建议) of "Fourth Plenum" – Oct. 2025	
	From a cautiously optimistic	to a more pessimistic view	
State of external environment	• International environment going through "turbulent transformation period" (动荡变革期) and globalization "counter-currents" (逆流)	• "World in turmoil and turbulence intensifying" (世界变乱交织、 动荡加剧); the international economic order facing "severe challenges" (严峻挑战)	
	<ul> <li>Yet: "Peace and development remain the themes of our times" (和平与发展仍然是时代主题)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"Geopolitical conflicts have become more frequent and easily triggered" (地缘冲突易发多发)</li> </ul>	
	From believing in constructive outcome	to a more realist/sober view and assertive posture	
China's general agency	• "Actively creating a <b>favourable</b> external environment" (积极营 造 <b>良好</b> 外部环境)	• "Proactively <b>shaping</b> external environment and international space" (主动 <b>运筹</b> 国际空间、塑造外部环境)	
	• "Uphold the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit" (高举和平、发展、合作、共赢旗帜)	<ul> <li>"Resolutely <b>oppose</b> hegemonism, power politics, and bullying"</li> <li>(坚决<b>反对</b>霸权霸道霸凌行径)</li> </ul>	
	From a participant	to a leader of reforms	
specifically on global governance reforms	• "Actively <b>participate</b> in global governance reform" (积极 <b>参与</b> 全 球治理体系改革)	• " <b>Lead</b> international order towards a more just and equitable direction" ( <b>引领</b> 国际秩序朝着更加公正合理的方向发展)	
Chinala harri ID	From UN-centricity	to highlighting the focus on "Global South"	
China's key IR reference system	<ul> <li>"Uphold UN-centered international system" (维护以联合国为核心的国际体系), underpinned by international law</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"Support the Global South's collective self-strengthening" (支持 全球南方联合自强)</li> </ul>	


Note: words in "x" are direct quotes/use of wordings by XI Jinping in his "explanation" or in "the proposition" document





# Policy topics (1/2): keywords put emphasis on sustainability, while re-calibrating health and medical care

# Keyword frequency analyses: 19th CC Fifth Plenum vs. 20th CC Fourth Plenum










Note: 14th FYP Jianyi: ~20,060 words; 15th FYP Jianyi: ~20,377 words — overall length comparable.


# Policy topics (2/2): keywords put emphasis on innovation, S&T topic and talents – no special focus on "digital"

# Keyword frequency analyses: 19th CC Fifth Plenum vs. 20th CC Fourth Plenum



# Actors: keywords reveal focus on "military" amid overall decline of emphasizing societal and economic actors


# Keyword frequency analyses: 19th CC Fifth Plenum vs. 20th CC Fourth Plenum



# Verbs: terms used by the "Fourth Plenum" indicate focus on "follow through" in policymaking

### Frequency of 18 key policymaking verbs across 3 life-cycle categories


19th CC Fifth Plenum vs. 20th CC Fourth Plenum



Note: one-to-one mapping of 18 key policymaking verbs across 3 categories in backup slide

Note: 14th FYP *Jianyi*: ~20,060 words; 15th FYP *Jianyi*: ~20,377 words — overall length comparable.

### Deep-dive: frequency of 18 key policymaking verbs



# Mapping of 18 key policymaking verbs across 3 life-cycle categories: initiation, follow-through, completion


No.	Category	Key policymaking verb	19 <sup>th</sup> CC Fifth Plenum	20 <sup>th</sup> CC Fourth Plenum	Change
		探索 (explore)	6	4	-33%
		建设 (build)	125	133	6%
1	Initiation	建立 (establish)	10	11	10%
	initiation	推动 (initiate)	54	57	6%
		构建 (construct)	26	26	0%
		制定 (formulate)	12	4	-67%
		实施 (implement)	37	48	30%
	Follow-through	推进 (advance)	76	107	41%
		深化 (deepen)	31	30	-3%
		优化 (refine)	31	40	29%
2		促进 (promote)	42	50	19%
		强化 (strengthen)	25	42	68%
		提高 (enhance)	49	49	0%
		扩大 (expand)	18	27	50%
		加快 (accelerate)	47	52	11%
		完善 (make it complete)	83	83	-2%
3	Completion	健全 (make sound)	65	53	-18%
		落实 (enforce)	13	21	62%



# Adjectives/adverbs: terms used by the "Fourth Plenum" focus on "effectiveness" in policymaking

### Frequency of 26 key policymaking adjectives/adverbs


19th CC Fifth Plenum vs. 20th CC Fourth Plenum



Note: one-to-one mapping of 26 key policymaking adjectives/adverbs across 4 categories in backup slide Note: 14th FYP *Jianyi*: ~20,060 words; 15th FYP *Jianyi*: ~20,377 words — overall length comparable.

### Deep-dive: frequency of 18 (of 26) most key policymaking adjectives/adverbs

19th CC Fifth Plenum vs. 20th CC Fourth Plenum



# 26 key policymaking adjectives/adverbs, clustered by effectiveness, normative, progressiveness and resilience

No.	Category	Key policymaking adjective	19 <sup>th</sup> CC Fifth Plenum	20th CC Fourth Plenum	Change
		协同 (synergistic)	10	22	120%
		系统 (systematic)	10	12	20%
1	Effectiveness	长效 (long-term effectiveness)	0	6	New keyword
	Effectiveness	协调 (harmonized)	23	17	-26%
		有序 (orderly)	5	15	200%
		高效 (efficient)	7	15	114%
		规范 (regulated)	10	14	40%
		法治 (rule of law)	21	25	19%
2	Normative	标准 (standardized)	18	20	11%
	Normative	透明 (transparent)	1	1	0%
		公平 (fair)	8	6	-25%
		可持续 (sustainable)	6	5	-17%
	Progressiveness	先进 (advanced)	4	8	100%
		更好 (better)	6	8	33%
		原创 (innovative)	0	3	New keyword
3		快速 (rapid)	0	2	New keyword
3		强大 (strong)	6	4	-33%
		深入 (in-depth)	17	23	35%
		主动 (proactive)	2	8	300%
		积极 (active)	20	14	-30%
		稳妥 (prudent)	1	3	200%
		稳定 (stable)	15	17	13%
4	Deciliones	可靠 (reliable)	2	2	0%
4	Resilience	可控 (controllable)	2	3	50%
		韧性 (resilient)	2	6	200%
		持久 (enduring)	0	2	New keyword



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
CMG services and resources



# Substance analysis: "Proposition" shows 7 key new political economy trends, compared to 14th Five-Year-Plan



The "Proposition" for the 15th FYP, as key output of the CCP 20th Central Committee's "Fourth Plenum"





### #1 Changing from a factor-input to TFP-led economic growth model

Evidence: (1) new top-level goal to grow TFP; (2) new goal to leverage overarching tech enabler esp. Al+ to upgrade industries; (3) new goal to enhance human capital development; (4) enhanced market-driven allocation of factors, with data and tech market as new reform areas

Deep-dive #1



# **#2 Shifting investment paradigm from infrastructure first to human capital first** ("investing in people")

Evidence: (1) New goal to increase household income's share in GDP; (2) New goals for welfare improvement incl. to build up all-life-cycle support system for all demographic groups; (3) Shifted investment focus—increasing public investment to people's welfare



### #3 Shifting security logic from "domestic resilience" to geoeconomic capacity

Evidence: (1) new goal to strengthen capacity to defend national security interests in foreign affairs; (2) new goal to improve tools to deal with foreign sanctions of foreign influence e.g. export control, investment screening



### #4 "NQPF": Focusing on next-level ambition for industrial competitiveness and high-tech leadership

Evidence: (1) Future industries more on-the-ground, newly positioned as economic growth driver; (2) Traditional industries newly targeted at maintaining global competitiveness; (3) New goal to obtain tech development "commanding height" (制高点)



### #5 Doubling-down on demand expansion—through industrial-upgrading-driven income increase

Evidence: (1) new top-level goal to increase consumption's share in GDP, consumption as primary force to drive economic growth; (2) calibrated supply-demand dynamics—from supply-led to demand-led market; (3) new approach to boost consumption by improving welfare



### #6 Reforming tax system towards stronger central fiscal spending and autonomous local tax revenues

Evidence: (1) new goal to broaden fiscal responsibilities for central government and increase central fiscal spending; (2) new goal to increase fiscal autonomy for local governments; (3) new approach for local revenue enhancement—activating idle state-owned assets



### #7 Systematically addressing China's overcapacity issue

Evidence: (1) Enhanced market governance efforts to address "involution" types of competition ( 内卷); (2) more explicit policy tone to





# 12 entirely new policy concepts identified in 6 areas – compared to "Third Plenum" 2024 and NPC 2025 (1/2)

Backup

### New policy concepts and significance Policy area **CMG** interpretation "Maintain China's competitiveness in traditional industries incl mining, metallurgy, China aims to stay competitive in "traditional" chemical, light industry, textile, machinery, shipbuilding, construction, etc." industries" (not phasing out) to preserve a • "巩固提升矿业、冶金、化工、轻工、纺织、机械、船舶、建筑等(传统)产 complete industrial system for resilience, plus to 业在全球产业分工中的地位和竞争力" ensure a more gradual and stable industrial transition Industrial "Improve statistical and monitoring system for service sector" upgrading & • "健全服务业统计监测体系" China intends to boost and better manage the tech service economy with a refined and dedicated innovation 3 "Progress new-type infrastructure construction moderately ahead of time" statistical approach • "适度超前建设新型基础设施" Economic policy China's tech ambition is shifting from "catchingup" as late comer to "pioneering and leader" "Obtain the 'commanding height' of S&T development" for frontier high-technologies • "抢占科技发展制高点" 5 "New demand to drive new supply, and new supply to create new demand — China is recalibrating its long-standing profostering a positive feedback loop between supply- and demand-side" supply policy attitude as part of how it sees Domestic • "以新需求引领新供给,以新供给创造新需求,供给和需求良性互动" supply-demand dynamics, now positioning demand demand as a factor for shaping supply—in system 6 "Strengthen efforts of inclusive policy measures that directly benefit consumers" previous thinking there was solely emphasis on • "加大直达消费者的普惠政策力度" supply driving demand "Promote the revitalization and shared utilization of the existing state-owned • China newly encourages to monetize idle state-**Fiscal** assets held by public institutions nationwide" owned assets (e.g. by leasing, securitization) to reform • "推讲全国行政事业单位存量国有资产盘活共享" ease local fiscal pressure

# 12 entirely new policy concepts identified in 6 areas – compared to "Third Plenum" 2024 and NPC 2025 (2/2)

Policy area		New policy concepts and significance	CMG interpretation	
Economic policy	Opening-up	<ul><li>8 "Ensure all market entities can both access market and operate business equally"</li><li>"落实好"准入又准营""</li></ul>		<ul> <li>FIEs to be ensured not only market access, but newly also fairer conditions in day-to-day operations in China's business environment</li> </ul>
		<ul><li>     "Guide rational and orderly cross-border transfer of industrial and supply chains"     "引导产业链供应链合理有序跨境布局" </li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>China signals new intent to gradually offshore industrial capacity with OFDI, as one lever to address the overcapacity issues</li> </ul>
	Green transition	<ul><li>         "Accelerate the building of a new-type power system"         <ul><li> "着力构建新型电力系统"</li></ul></li></ul>	•	<ul> <li>This energy transition priority serves to build a new power infrastructure and market that can better accommodate both use and transactions of renewable energy</li> </ul>
policy	Global	<ul><li>     "Build a community of shared future with neighboring countries"     "构建周边命运共同体" </li></ul>	•	China seems to further elevate importance of more assertively shaping its strategic conditions externally beyond relationship with the US
Foreign policy	governance	<ul> <li>"Support the Global South's collective self-reliance / "strength", strengthen foreign aid efforts, and provide more public goods internationally"</li> <li>"支持全球南方联合自强,加大援外力度,提供更多国际公共产品"</li> </ul>	•	



# Deep-dive 1: investment focus is shifting from "investing in things" (投资于物) to "investing in people" (投资于人)


# What does "investing in people" mean?

# Definition

 "Investing in People" means more fiscal funds and public resources are invested in people and improving people's livelihood

# Underlying logic

- Unleashing consumption potential with improved income and better livelihood
- Enhancing human capital with elevated productivity



# Why China has to shift to "investing in people"?

Key context—old "physical capital" model: for a long time, China focused on "physical capital" investment (e.g., infrastructure), with quick and visible results. "Human capital" investments required patience and were slow in results, thus less favored. However, this has changed now:



Declining return of "physical capital" investment

people"


- "Physical capital" investment is close to saturation in China
- Incremental capital-output ratio grew from 2.84 to 9.44 (2008-2023) -> investment needed to increase output significantly increased

More people care about



- Increasing
   multiplier of
   "investing in
   the quality of life, and are willing to spend for health, capability, and experiences
   Significant "multiplier
  - Significant "multiplier effect", e.g., larger spending power, higher labour quality, and enhanced innovation

### **CMG view**: What are key success factors?





- <u>Central fiscal support</u>: stronger central gov. fiscal support to ensure stable funding for "investing in people"
- Local gov. capability: necessary fiscal reform to enhance local gov. revenue, e.g., sharing consumption tax between central and local
- KPI adjustment: adjust KPI for local officials, prioritize long-term investment in people rather than short-term visible outcomes



# <u>Deep-dive 2</u>: China seeks to improve household income and equality to build larger middle-class consumer base

### **Key issues:** low labor income share in GDP and inequality





# China's policy seeks to use 4 levers to increase income and improve equality

# "Making bigger cake"

(Raise total income with higher value-added labor output)

• Develop **high-value-added industries** (e.g. advanced manufacturing, high-end services) to create more **high-skilled**, **high-paying jobs** 

### "Dividing cake better"

(Labor to share more gains from total income pool)

- Guide enterprises to raise **employee compensation** in line with productivity and profitability increase
- Curb excessive reinvestment and speculative use of profits, directing more returns to labor

# "Redistributing cake fairly"

(Narrow income gaps through fiscal and social transfers)

- **Progressive tax reform** (e.g. on income, property, inheritance) to prevent wealth concentration
- Enhance **public welfare** and targeted subsidies to mid- and low-income groups

# "Baking other types of cakes"

(Diversify household income sources beyond wages)

- Broaden access to capital markets (e.g. pensions, mutual funds, REITs) for household investment
- Households to gain more stable and productive returns from real estate holdings, e.g. rental market
- Encourage **employee stock ownership** in enterprises

Sources: UNECE, International Labor Organization



# <u>Deep-dive</u>: broad policy "anti-involution" measures complement market trends in addressing overcapacity

	Systemic level							
	Restriction of local gov. policy	Limit local governments from offering excessive preferential policy incentives to attract investment						
	"Price war" governance	Provide government or regulatory guidance to curb destructive price competition in key industries and stabilize market prices						
	Domestic demand expansion	Stimulate domestic consumption to support market growth						
es	Overseas support	Assist firms in expanding internationally to reduce domestic overcapacity pressure						
Policy measures	Investment focus change	Investment focus sl	nift from domestic capac	city expansion to RoA/Ro	E approach for state-o	wned assets and OFDI as	sets	
cy me	<u>Sector-level</u>	Steel	Cement	Chemicals	NEVs	Batteries	Solar (PV)	
Polic	Government-guided price coordination	•	•	0	•	•	•	
	Export management		$\bigcirc$		•	•		
	Capacity offshoring	•	0	•	•		•	
	Raising industrial standards		•	•		•		
<b>L</b>	Government-guided capacity coordination		0	•	0	•		
٠, ب	Consolidation	•					•	
Market	OFDI	•	0	•	0	•	•	
	Price stabilization	•	•	•	0	•	•	
	Aggregated effect to date	Strong	Limited	Limited	Mid	Strong	Strong	



# <u>Calibration</u>: "Proposition" stays within "DC" framework, but adjusts priorities and adds evolved policy thinking

Six policy pillars of "Dual Circulation (DC)"			from shift in 14 <sup>th</sup> FYP	to emphasis in 15 <sup>th</sup> FYP	
并同意格	Social "rebalancing"	<ul> <li>"Common prosperity"</li> <li>Social fairness and social protection</li> <li>Balanced regional and urban-rural development</li> </ul>	Elevate social policy to the level of economic policy	Shifted investment focus to «people»	
	Domestic demand system (内需体系)	<ul> <li>Expand domestic consumption</li> <li>Build unified national market</li> <li>Increase efficiency and return of public investment</li> </ul>	Make household consumption core driver of economic growth	Demand as a factor for shaping supply	
坚 持 统第发展和安全	"De-risking" (统筹发展与安全)	<ul> <li>Protect 17 key security needs (e.g. food security)</li> <li>Increase resilience of governance and economy</li> <li>Build towards more technological "self-reliance"</li> </ul>	"Embrace" need for trade-offs between development and security	Shifted focus from "domestic resilience" to geoeconomic capacity	
THINA 中国制造	Industrial upgrading	<ul> <li>Enhance indigenous innovation</li> <li>SSSR*, modernized and complete industrial system</li> <li>Unleash growth potential of service sector</li> </ul>	Improve function/role of government (政府起到的作用)	Next-level indutrial competitiveness and deepened industry-university-research synergy (产学研协同)	
A CA	Market-oriented reforms	<ul> <li>SOE reform to sharpen SOE competitiveness</li> <li>Unleash the potential of all types of market entities</li> <li>Market governance progression</li> </ul>	Add focus on market governance ("visible hand")	Factor market reform, "anti- involution" and further improving function of government	
种效地	High-level opening-up	<ul> <li>Broaden opening-up in more sectors</li> <li>Facilitate Chinese ODFI and more trade integration</li> <li>More active participation in global governance</li> </ul>	Continue open-up "unilaterally" and "autonomously" (自主)	Add focus on OFDI and industrial capacity offshoring	



# **Agenda**

- 1 Reviewing the "Fourth Plenum" of the CCP's 20<sup>th</sup> Central Committee
  - Strategic context synopsis
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  - "Proposition" (建议) formal analysis
  - "Proposition" (建议) policy substance analysis
- Proposed strategic considerations for European / international business

CMG services and resources



# **Proposed strategic considerations for European / international business**

### HQ-level

- "Getting China right"
  - · China as emerging tech winner
  - Analyzing China as China and from "within"
  - China beyond the "B2B" arena
- Geopolitical factors
  - Doing business with China, under increasingly multipolar conditions
- Evolving strategic themes
  - Leverage China as a value creation system not just "doing business in China"
  - Leverage subsidiaries' experience in competing / collaborating with Chinese firms for third / home markets
  - Rapidly evolving collaboration models with Chinese (state) capital

### FIE in China effectiveness

- Strategic self-awareness what was past business success really driven by?
- Strategic choice / clarity: four archetype strategies (cf. next slide)
- Policy alignment (e.g. awards, subsidies, research programs)
- Corporate citizenship
- Local-style networking
- Governmental Affairs capability

### HQ-China subsidiary alignment – critical questions


- Aligned analysis?
- Long-term thinking in Europe vs. in China?
- Europe's self-interests?



# Sector view: growth, policy and sector/market trends for foreign business sectors during and from the 15th FYP

		Key growth drivers during 15th FYP	Key sectoral policy / governance trends	High-level sector/market trends
	Industrial and machinery	<ul> <li>Key drivers: demographics, rising operational costs, and competition</li> <li>Full-scale transition toward automation</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>New Industrialization (新型工业化)</li> <li>Digital transformation</li> <li>Support for specialized SMEs (专精特新)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Strong market growth</li> <li>Mass deployment of automated production</li> <li>Market consolidation amid competition</li> </ul>
11 The state	Energy and climate	<ul> <li>Policy-driven fossil fuel substitution with renewable energy</li> <li>Infrastructure upgrading esp. grid</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Carbon peak (2030)</li><li>Energy market reform</li><li>Green manufacturing</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Financialization and investor pull</li> <li>Regionally asymmetric energy landscape</li> </ul>
-	Civil aviation	<ul> <li>Key drivers: world-largest middle-class population, growing cargo demand</li> <li>World largest air travel market by 2043</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Airport network expansion</li> <li>Low altitude/drone economy &amp; UAM</li> <li>"Green" aviation (esp. SAF)</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Domestic pax demand in resilient growth</li> <li>Rise of LCCs and regional players</li> <li>Point-to-point connectivity in smaller cities</li> </ul>
	Chemicals and materials	<ul> <li>Increasing demand for advanced/specialty chemicals used for high-tech sectors</li> <li>Increasing demand for green chemicals</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Push for green processing</li> <li>Recycling of chemical waste</li> <li>Advanced materials as strategic sub-sector</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Integration with strategic downstream sectors</li> <li>Growing recycled-content market</li> </ul>
	Automotive	<ul><li>Electrification scale</li><li>NEV infrastructure</li><li>Software-defined vehicle platforms</li></ul>	<ul> <li>Digitalization of automotive industry</li> <li>Expanding charging facilities network</li> <li>"Anti-involution"</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Greater NEV penetration; rapid growth</li><li>Consolidation and vertical integration</li><li>Product premiumization</li></ul>
	Transport, logistics and shipping	<ul> <li>Growing e-commerce parcel volumes</li> <li>Scalable digital platforms that integrate last-mile cross-border flows</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Rail-sea-road multimodal integration</li> <li>Creation of "National Hubs"</li> <li>Digitalization and smart logistics</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Logistics services ecosystem growth</li><li>Supply chain reconfiguration towards hubs</li><li>Acceleration of warehouse automation</li></ul>
	Pharma and MedTech	<ul> <li>Key drivers: middle-class, aging population, social security, growing health awareness</li> <li>Fast growth of innovative drugs</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Healthcare affordability</li> <li>Public procurement reform</li> <li>Localization of high-end medical devices</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Demographics sustain long-term demand</li> <li>Rapid scaling of Al-enabled diagnostics</li> <li>Localization of high-value segments</li> </ul>
7 %	Financial services	<ul> <li>Key drivers: demand for pensions, health insurance, and wealth management</li> <li>State-led financial governance reform</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>"Five Chapters" for financial service sector</li> <li>Financial stability and systemic risk control</li> <li>Capital market deepening to support NQPF</li> </ul>	<ul><li>Increasing customization</li><li>Profit margin compression</li><li>Rebalancing away from real estate and LGFVs</li></ul>
HARLO	Semi- conductor value chain	<ul> <li>Downstream demand from electrification and AI ecosystems</li> <li>State-driven tech self-reliance agenda</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Indigenization of supply chain</li> <li>Massive capital deployment mechanisms</li> <li>Talent and R&amp;D ecosystem</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>Increasing localization of upper-stream areas in value chain</li> </ul>

# Anticipating China's annual calendar: monitoring key events/meetings until end 2026






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# **CMG** services and resources



# CMG's four key service areas



Consulting is our service area that focuses on supporting our clients in devising factually up-to-date, clearly articulated and actionable corporate strategies and plannings or – more generally – the requisite research and analysis for sound decision-making. Our products are fully tailored to our clients' needs as well as evolving sector, market, competitive and regulatory realities. We usually co-create, working closely with our clients, bringing CMG's capabilities, experience and methodologies complementarily to the ongoing discussions and project work at our client for highest value-add and impact.



Monitoring is our service area that focuses on delivering regular and tailored monitoring reports for our clients that concisely yet systematically summarize relevant developments of given time-frames and flag key implications. The monitoring framework is being aligned and finetuned as needed with our clients and takes the breadth and depth seen as most value-adding, considering all available reports and information channels. Monitoring reports can be delivered to governance, executive or cross-functional bodies both at headquarter level and for the China operations. With client feedbacks, CMG optimizes layout, language and analytical depth to continually increase value-add of these monitoring reports



Briefing is our service area that focuses on preparing outside-in content inputs as high-value engagements with the clients and their governance, executive or cross-functional bodies, or any relevant process or platform. The goal of briefings is not immediate content decisions or conclusions, but their substance shall help bring critical momentum to ongoing discussions, identify open strategic questions and help spur process alignment on what further action shall be taken.

Briefings can take place with or without actively involving the expertise and viewpoints of the clients' China operations – if involved, CMG can bring its cross-cultural DNA to full fruition for more ambitious alignment. In fact, briefings for global bodies are often initiated by China operations. Tailored research mandates also result in briefings.



Learning is our service area that focuses on curating fully tailored high-value interactions and events focusing or related to China for our clients. CMG can take different roles in such interactions and events, as moderator, speaker, (co-)host or note-taker. Preceding the interaction or event, there are usually several steps of co-creation with the client: a detailed alignment on the clients' needs and vision for the event, followed by the calibrated search of suited experts/speakers, preparing clear and engaging marketing materials and developing rundown covering event logistics and all required pre-event briefings. A key type of interaction learning CMG has special expertise in are training or business learning conferences where the goal is to equip a target group with relevant conceptual or practical knowledge and insights for transfer into day-to-day work contexts.



# **Key publication series: CMG Primers**

Understanding the "Taiwan issue" – context, influencing factors and outlook

Chinese government remodeled at the Two Sessions 2023 – policy, people and structure Understanding supply chain distortions of critical minerals powering the green energy transition

Xi's third 'Third Plenum' pivots to implementation, doubling down on China's industrial ambition

Caixin Summit 2024 - CMG's analytical digest: slide deck and read-out webinar recording











Understanding process and key outcomes of China's 20<sup>th</sup> Party Congress



Two Sessions 2024 – Strengthening proactive and better coordinated economic policy





Understanding China's economy into 2025 – evolved development strategy, reform priorities and short-term macroeconomic management




2025 "Two Sessions" - implementing reforms as follow-through from the "Third Plenum" in the face of insufficient domestic demand and





# **EUCCC-CMG** report "Riskful Thinking – Navigating the Politics of Economic Security"













Download report here



# CMG-hosted webinar series: China's 15th FYP 2026-2030 – building towards China's next milestone in 2035



**26 February 2025** 9-945am CET | 4-445pm CST Dealing with Trump 2.0 – is China making tactical or strategic adjustments in view of the 15th FYP? **DA Wei**, Director of Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and Professor of International Relations, Tsinghua University



9 October 2025

9-945am CEST | 3-345pm CST "Changes Unseen in a Century" – How Beijing Sees Foreign Affairs, Geopolitics and Geoeconomics as It Drafts the 15th Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030)

Yu Tiejun, President of the Institute of International and Strategic

Studies (IISS), Professor at the School of International Studies (SIS) of Peking University (PKU) 23 April 2025 November 2025 9-945am CEST | 3-345pm CST



**ZHU Guangyao**, former Vice-Minister of Finance and Counsellor of the State Council



9-945am CET | 4-445pm CST "Reality check" - interpreting the "15th FYP outline" as per the 20th CC 5th Plenum and anticipating shifts

BAI Chong-En, Dean of School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University



20 June 2025 9-945am CEST | 3-345pm CST The long view – 10-year outlook imagining China in 2035 as the next key modernization milestone

**XIE Danxia**, Associate Professor at the Institute of Economics, Tsinghua University



December 2025 9-945am CEST | 4-445pm CST Transitioning to the 15th FYP – zooming-in on Shenzhen as local government case-study

**ZHANG Lin**, Director of Science, Technology and Innovation Commission of Shenzhen Municipality
























# "Summer Davos" – a multi-year partnership engaging international Executives on China analysis




# Tianjin 2023 Dalian 2024 Tianjin 2025



Predictions and insights on seven emerging geoeconomic trends







Six building blocks for effective corporate strategy-making in China today













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