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China's 15th Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030): recap policy trajectory, key evolutions compared to 14th FYP and select strategy inputs for foreign business

Reading deck for participants to stars China alumni study tour to Shenzhen and Guangzhou 2026

April 2026

Contact:

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Corporate profile

- ✓ CMG is an agile, service-minded and innovative **management consulting and research firm**
- ✓ CMG serves **international corporate, investment and public sectors** on China related questions
- ✓ It specializes in aiding **strategic decision-making** of governance, executive and functional bodies
- ✓ CMG combines three **core capabilities**: policy (domestic + trade conditionalities), business and strategy
- ✓ CMG operates with presences in **Zurich, Munich and Shanghai**

How we work

<p>«China inside-out»</p> <p>Cross-cultural team, extensive networks in China, “reality checked” China analysis and also accountable to the Chinese discourse</p>	<p>Inter-disciplinarity</p> <p>Business / strategy, public policy / political science, macro-economy, geopolitics / geoeconomics / trade</p>	<p>“Multipolar” analytically</p> <p>For geopolitical / geoeconomic analysis actively use, seek and iterate with expertise and views from different “poles”</p>	<p>Epistemological and dialectical values</p> <p>Original, fact-based and calibrated</p> <p>Dialectics seen as resource and a process principle</p>	<p>Professional services DNA</p> <p>Listening, ownership and co-creation as foundation to build trusted and tailored collaborations</p>
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Our value proposition – 6 service areas

1		<p>Consulting</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategy devising / review • HQ-subsidiary alignment
2		<p>Briefing</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strategic business context • Market / competitive trends
3		<p>Sector/market/tech intelligence</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Value-chain, competitive and go-to-market • Tech, cluster and ecosystem analysis
4		<p>Partnering with Chinese firms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partner mapping and evaluation • Collaboration concepts
5		<p>Monitoring</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Policy / sector / market factors • Geopolitical / risk factors
6		<p>Learning & curation</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Learning conferences / fact-finding • Trainings, events and moderations



At a glance – CMG’s 17 major publications to date



October 2022

Understanding process and key outcomes of China's 20th Party Congress



February 2023

Understanding the "Taiwan-issue" – context, influencing factors and outlook



March 2023

Chinese government remodelled at Two Sessions 2023 – policy, people and structure



May 2023

Understanding supply distortions of critical minerals powering the green energy transition



July 2023

EU-China relations – from economic integration to EU's strategic autonomy and 'de-risking'



September 2023

Sino-Swiss – from honing a "special relationship" to balancing new geopolitical complexities



January 2024

Understanding process and influencing factors of Taiwan's 2024 presidential election



March 2024

Two Sessions 2024 - Strengthening proactive and better coordinated economic policy



April 2024

EUCCC-CMG report "Riskful thinking – navigating the politics of economic security"



April 2024

China's risk management – 'Coordinate development and security'



July 2024

Xi's third 'Third Plenum' pivots to implementation, doubling down on China's industrial ambition



December 2024

Caixin Summit 2024 - CMG's analytical digest: slide deck and read-out webinar recording



January 2025

Understanding China's economy into 2025: Publication & read-out webinar



March 2025

2025 "Two Sessions" - implementing reforms as follow-through from the "Third Plenum" in the face of insufficient domestic demand and Trump 2.0



April 2025

CMG's external evaluation of the Swiss government's China Strategy (March 2021), mandated by the Swiss MFA



November 2025

"Fourth Plenum": towards more assertively shaping strategic conditions externally to better focus on "Chinese-style modernization" internally




December 2025

New CMG Primer, analyzing China's evolving approach to export controls

New

CMG publication reference: EUCCC-CMG report “Riskful Thinking – Navigating the Politics of Economic Security”



[Download report here](#)

CMG hosted webinars: leading Chinese academics and policymaking representatives in our past webinars



- **YAO Yang**, Professor and Dean of the Dishuihu Advanced Finance Institute at the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and former Dean of Peking University's National School of Development (NSD)
- **YU Tiejun**, President of the Institute of International and Strategic Studies (IISS), Professor at the School of International Studies (SIS) in Peking University (PKU)
- **XIE Danxia**, Associate Professor at the Institute of Economics, Tsinghua University
- **ZHU Guangyao**, Vice Chairman of CCIEE and Former Vice Minister of Finance
- **DA Wei**, Director of Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS) and Professor of International Relations, Tsinghua University
- **WANG Yong**, Academic Deputy Dean of the Institute of New Structural Economics, Peking University
- **LU Feng**, Emeritus Professor of Economics and former Deputy Dean of the National School of Development, Peking University
- **WANG Zhengxu**, Professor at Department of Political Science, School of Public Affairs, Zhejiang University
- **LI Shi**, Dean of Institute for Common Prosperity and Development, Zhejiang University
- **YU Miaojie**, President and University Chair Professor of Liaoning University, and Liberal-Art Chair Professor of Peking University
- **BAI Chong-En**, Mansfield Freeman Chair Professor; Dean, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University
- **XING Yujing**, Senior Adviser, Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA); Former President, Shenzhen branch of PBoC
- **JIA Qingguo**, Member, Standing Committee of the 11th–14th National Committee of the CPPCC (2008–); Member; Director of the Center on Global Governance of Peking University; Former Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University
- **FU Cong**, Ambassador and Head of the Mission of the People's Republic of China to the European Union
- **ZHU Feng**, Dean and Professor, School of International Studies, Nanjing University; Non-Resident Researcher, Institute of International Studies
- **ZHA Daojiong**, Professor, Department of International Political Economy, School of International Studies, Peking University
- **HUANG Yiping**, Deputy Dean and Sinar Mas Chair Professor of Finance and Economics, National School of Development, Peking University
- **LI Xin**, Managing Editor, Caixin Global; Vice President, Caixin Media; Managing Director, Caixin Global Singapore
- **WU Yongping**, Director of the Institute for Taiwan Studies and Former Vice Dean of the School of Public Administration, Tsinghua University

CMG hosted webinars: “Staying in dialogue with China” and Sector Dialogues



CHINA MACRO GROUP

“STAYING IN DIALOGUE WITH CHINA”

Webinar series 2026 - 5th edition


4 webinars featuring top-tier experts on strategic macro policy trends

Four Key Issues Shaping China’s Political Economy in 2026
Based on priorities from the CCP Fourth Plenum and the 2025 Central Economic Work Conference

Social policy and 'invest in people'	Overcapacity and 'anti-involution'	Factor / national unified market	NQPF and "future industries"
			
Apr/May 2026	Jun/Jul 2026	Sep/Oct 2026	Nov/Dec 2026

Helping international business understand China *InsideOut*

STAY TUNED 



CHINA MACRO GROUP


“SECTOR DIALOGUES”

行业对话


A new thread of CMG webinars

Engage with sector representatives to capture insights on market trends, policy, foreign business in China, geopolitical factors, and overall sector sentiment.


Past Webinar #1: 13th March - China’s chemicals sector today - between overcapacities, innovative ingenuity and decarbonization responsibility

 **Guest Speaker**

PANG Guanglian | 庞广廉
Executive Board Member
Vice Secretary-General
China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Federation (CPCIF)




#ChinaInsideOut #MacroMesoMicro


STAY TUNED 

“Summer Davos” – a multi-year partnership engaging international Executives on China analysis


Tianjin 2023



Predictions and insights on seven emerging geoeconomic trends



Dalian 2024



Six building blocks for effective corporate strategy-making in China today



Tianjin 2025



Agenda

1 China's 15th Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030)

- Recap policy trajectory since 2020/2021 and China's playbook for dealing with Trump 2.0
- Select formal analysis
- Select substantive analysis

2 Select strategy inputs for foreign business

Agenda

1 China's 15th Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030)

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2020/2021: China's 14th Five-Year-Plan is seen as of historic importance and representing a "strategic shift"



LI Junru

Former Vice-President of the Central Party School, in an interview with China News Service's "China focus face to face" (中国焦点面对面) on 26th October 2020

*"The core of the **[14th Five-year] plan** is to realize the **biggest strategic shift since** the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee [in **1978**] and the establishment of a market economy system. [...]*

*Now China clearly wants to promote the transformation of the economy from high-speed growth to high-quality development in accordance with the **new development concept**.*

*"规划核心要义就是实现(十一届)三中全会以来、建立市场经济体制以来**最大的一个战略转移**[...] 现在中国明确要按照**新发展理念**推动经济从高速增长到高质量发展转变。*

2021: “Dual Circulation” as core of 14th FYP’s realizes “strategic shift” with 3 new top-level policy dimensions

Six policy dimensions of “Dual Circulation” development strategy...

... manifested shift per dimension



**Social
“rebalancing”**

- “Common prosperity”
- Social fairness and social protection
- Balanced regional and urban-rural development

Elevate social policy to the level of economic policy



**Domestic demand system
(内需体系)**

- Expand domestic consumption
- Build unified national market
- Increase efficiency and return of public investment

Make household consumption core driver of economic growth



**“De-risking”
(统筹发展与安全)**

- Protect 17 key security needs (e.g. food security)
- Increase resilience of governance and economy
- Build towards more technological “self-reliance”

Top-down and systemic risk management



Industrial upgrading

- Enhance indigenous innovation
- SSSR*, modernized and complete industrial system
- Unleash growth potential of service sector

*Improve function/role of government
(政府起到的作用)*



Market-oriented reforms

- SOE reform to sharpen SOE competitiveness
- Unleash the potential of all types of market entities
- Market governance progression

*Add focus on market governance
 (“visible hand”)*



Opening-up

- Broaden opening-up in more sectors
- Facilitate Chinese ODFI and more trade integration
- More active participation in global governance


Continue open-up “unilaterally” and “autonomously” (自主)

New policy dimension

New policy emphasis

20th Party Congress (Oct. 2022): consolidating China's conceptual / strategic "emancipation" from the "West"

Xi's delivering political report – a televised 2h speech



CCP charting China's own path



- «Chinese-style modernization» (中国式现代化)
- New development theory and «central task» of the party towards the second centenary goal in 2049



- «Whole process democracy» (全过程民主)
- China's new conceptual alternative for civic rights and political participation



- Cultural confidence and "self-reliance" (文化自信自强)
- Using same concept as in science & technology (自强), it is now about more than mere confidence



- «Keep aligned interests with developing countries» (维护发展中国家共同利益)
- Emphasizing cooperation with developing countries to diversify from the "West"

CCP Third Plenum (July 2024): Trump's re-election as strategic premise, deciding broad reform accelerations



Socialist market economy

- Equal treatment
- POE vs. party reconciliation

Opening-up – esp. to non-US

- In- and out-bound
- «Proactively align with high-standard international economic rules»

CCP Fourth Plenum (Oct. 2025): formalizing a new attitude towards external affairs – deviating strongly vs. 2020

Dimension	“Proposition” (建议) of “Fifth Plenum” – Oct. 2020	“Proposition” (建议) of “Fourth Plenum” – Oct. 2025
State of external environment	<p style="text-align: center;">From a cautiously optimistic...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> International environment going through “<i>turbulent transformation period</i>” (动荡变革期) and globalization “<i>counter-currents</i>” (逆流) Yet: “<i>Peace and development remain the themes of our times</i>” (和平与发展仍然是时代主题) 	<p style="text-align: center;">... to a more pessimistic view</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>World in turmoil and turbulence intensifying</i>” (世界变乱交织、动荡加剧); <i>the international economic order facing “severe challenges”</i> (严峻挑战) “<i>Geopolitical conflicts have become more frequent and easily triggered</i>” (地缘冲突易发多发)
China’s general agency...	<p style="text-align: center;">From believing in constructive outcome...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>Actively creating a favourable external environment</i>” (积极营造良好外部环境) “<i>Uphold the banner of peace, development, cooperation, and mutual benefit</i>” (高举和平、发展、合作、共赢旗帜) 	<p style="text-align: center;">... to a more realist/sober view and assertive posture</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>Proactively shaping</i> external environment and international space” (主动运筹国际空间、塑造外部环境) “<i>Resolutely oppose</i> hegemonism, power politics, and bullying” (坚决反对霸权霸道霸凌行径)
... specifically on global governance reforms	<p style="text-align: center;">From a participant...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>Actively participate</i> in global governance reform” (积极参与全球治理体系改革) 	<p style="text-align: center;">...to a leader of reforms</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>Lead</i> international order towards a more just and equitable direction” (引领国际秩序朝着更加公正合理的方向发展)
China’s key IR reference system	<p style="text-align: center;">From UN-centricity...</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>Uphold UN-centered</i> international system” (维护以联合国为核心的国际体系), <i>underpinned by international law</i> 	<p style="text-align: center;">... to highlighting the focus on “Global South”</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> “<i>Support the Global South’s</i> collective self-strengthening” (支持全球南方联合自强)

Note: words in “x” are direct quotes/use of wordings by Xi Jinping in his “explanation” or in “the proposition” document

US-China relationship: “full circle” from Xi-Obama (2012) to Xi-Trump (2025)?

«New great power relations»?




February 2012

Trade deal



October 2025

Backed by China’s control actions on critical minerals (矿产) after July 2023 – five activating “global chokepoints”



		Activating a “global choke-point”	Activating a “global choke-point”	International obligations	Activating a “global choke-point”	Activating a “global choke-point”	Activating a “global choke-point”
Control type assessment	Formal control purpose	National security	National security	Non-proliferation	National security	National security	National security
	China’s industrial policy logic	Industrial policy priorities (advanced metal materials)	Matured industrial capabilities	Industrial policy priorities (advanced metal materials)	Industrial policy priorities (advanced metal materials)	Industrial policy priorities (advanced REE materials)	Industrial policy priorities (advanced REE materials)
	Triggered by US actions	✓	✓	✗	✓	✓	✓
	Impacted all trade partners	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Control design	End-use/user clarification needed	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	License required for all exports	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
	License required for re-export overseas	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✓
	Types of controlled items	Raw materials	Raw materials	Raw materials, materials, tech, equipment	Raw materials, materials, tech	Raw materials, materials	Raw materials, materials, tech, equipment

Oct 9 control 1st Chinese case of “long-arm jurisdiction” – after Xi-Trump meeting this control suspended on 8 Nov. 2025 until 10 Nov. 2026

China's Trump 2.0 playbook: China shapes for multipolarity and unabating, China-backed economic globalization

China's strategic goal for international political order: ensuring "equal and orderly" multipolarity

1

Strengthening China-led cooperation

- **Non-Western/regional governance formats:** SCO, BRICS+, ASEAN-GCC, «community of shared future with neighboring countries», RCEP-led trade integration in Asia-Pacific
- **"Global South":** support "collective self-reliance"
- **Belt-and-Road:** multi-dimensional connectivity

2

Projecting China as "constructive force"

- **WTO:** relinquishing 'developing country' status to signal commitment to global trade rules
- **«NQPF»:** sharing access to emerging/future tech with developing countries
- **Sense of responsibility:** China halting trade escalation with US, declaring 120% tariffs as ceiling

3

China shaping global governance

- **Global cooperation:** GDI (development delivery), GSI (security cooperation), GCI (civilizational dialogue), and GGI (governance reform)
- **New IOs:** International Organization for Mediation (IOMED) to promote peaceful conflict resolution; proposal to set up China-UN Global South-South Development Support Mechanism

China's strategic goal for international economic order: ensuring unabating, China-backed "inclusive" economic globalization

4

Deepening integration with world economy

- **High-standard international economic rules:** «Proactively align» («Third Plenum», July 2024), ongoing WTO compliance audit, CPTPP application
- **2-way opening-up:** 'autonomous' market access, unilateral tariff / FDI cancellations, simplified OFDI approvals, «holistic overseas support»
- **Domestic level playing field:** equal treatment and lawful business environment

5

Building structural geoeconomic power

- **WTO reforms:** reform for better compatibility with China's economic model
- **FTAs/RTAs:** expand China-centered trade networks
- **Standard setting:** shape standards of «future tech»
- **Internationalizing RMB:** in transactions and as reserve currency, reducing «USD hegemony»
- **CIPS:** building non-SWIFT payment infrastructure

6

Building geoeconomic control points/tools

- **Export controls:** evolve export control practice to include geoeconomic control points and tools
- **In- / outbound FDI screening:** protect critical infrastructure and national security domestically and control on strategic capital outflow
- **Sanctions:** deter coercion + retaliatory capacity
- **Cross-border data:** control 'important' and 'personal' data outflows for digital sovereignty

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15th FYP structure: 18 chapters covering four policy areas – one chapter less, urbanization new as sub-chapter

目录		I		II		III		IV	
第一篇 奋力开创中国式现代化建设新局面	2	第十五章 大力提振消费	44	第十五章 大力提振消费	44	第三十二章 加强海洋开发利用和保护	74	第五十章 加快形成绿色生产生活方式	115
第一章 发展环境	2	第十六章 扩大有效投资	46	第十六章 扩大有效投资	46	第三十三章 弘扬和践行社会主义核心价值观	77	第五十一章 加强国家安全体系和能力建设	117
第二章 指导方针	2	第十七章 纵深推进全国统一大市场建设	46	第十七章 纵深推进全国统一大市场建设	46	第三十四章 大力繁荣文化事业和文化产业	78	第五十二章 保障国家经济安全	118
第三章 主要目标	2	第十八章 充分激发各类经营主体的内生动力	46	第十八章 充分激发各类经营主体的内生动力	46	第三十五章 加快发展文化事业和文化产业	83	第五十三章 提高公共安全治理水平	120
第二篇 建设现代化产业体系 巩固壮大实体经济根基	11	第十九章 加快完善要素市场化配置体制机制	49	第十九章 加快完善要素市场化配置体制机制	49	第三十六章 提升中华文明传播力和影响力	84	第五十四章 完善社会治理体系	121
第四章 优化提升传统产业	11	第二十章 健全宏观经济治理体系	49	第二十章 健全宏观经济治理体系	49	第三十七章 建设生育友好型社会	86	第五十五章 着力提高国防和军队现代化水平	124
第五章 培育壮大新兴产业和未来产业	12	第二十一章 积极扩大自主开放	53	第二十一章 积极扩大自主开放	53	第三十八章 办好人民满意的教育	87	第五十六章 巩固提高一体化国家战略体系和能力	125
第六章 促进服务业优质高效发展	12	第二十二章 提升贸易投资合作水平	53	第二十二章 提升贸易投资合作水平	53	第三十九章 加快建设健康中国	90	第五十七章 发展全过程人民民主	126
第七章 构建现代化基础设施体系	18	第二十三章 高质量共建“一带一路”	58	第二十三章 高质量共建“一带一路”	58	第四十章 积极应对人口老龄化	93	第五十八章 推进全面依法治国	127
第三篇 加快高水平科技自立自强 引领发展新质生产力	26	第二十四章 推动构建人类命运共同体	58	第二十四章 推动构建人类命运共同体	58	第四十一章 促进高质量充分就业	96	第五十九章 促进香港、澳门长期繁荣稳定	128
第八章 加强原始创新和关键核心技术攻关	26	第二十五章 提升农业综合生产能力	61	第二十五章 提升农业综合生产能力	61	第四十二章 完善收入分配制度	98	第六十章 推动两岸关系和平发展	128
第九章 提高体系化创新能力	27	第二十六章 推进宜居宜业和美乡村建设	61	第二十六章 推进宜居宜业和美乡村建设	61	第四十三章 健全社会保障体系	100	第六十一章 坚持和完善“一国两制”	128
第十章 强化企业科技创新主体地位	27	第二十七章 提高强农惠农富农政策效能	61	第二十七章 提高强农惠农富农政策效能	61	第四十四章 推动房地产高质量发展	101	第六十二章 推进祖国统一	128
第十一章 一体推进教育科技人才发展	32	第二十八章 增强区域发展协调性	67	第二十八章 增强区域发展协调性	67	第四十五章 稳步推进基本公共服务均等化	102	第六十三章 促进粤港澳大湾区高质量发展	128
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Economic policy

Social policy

Security/governance

FYP goals/governance



Key changes vs. 14FYP: industry moved before innovation, and digital before domestic market (previously named 'Dual Circulation')

New concepts (1/3): 19 entirely new policy concepts/terms across 5 policy areas of 15th Five-Year-Plan full text

Theme		Observed new term in 15 th FYP	Significance	CMG interpretation
Economic reforms	Macro & fiscal governance	1 全口径政府投资计划 (“All-inclusive government investment planning”) : consolidates off-budget vehicles (special-purpose bonds, policy bank loans) with general budget under unified planning	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Closes fiscal visibility gaps that allowed hidden financial leverage to accumulate Enables more effective macro control
		2 宏观资产负债表管理 (“National macroeconomic balance sheet management”) : shifts official diagnostic lens from flow variables (GDP, deficit) to stock variables (assets vs. liabilities)	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Gives policymakers a "CFO-level" view of sovereign solvency, including off-balance-sheet exposures Effective tool to monitor local debt and hidden liabilities
	Factor markets	3 全国数据资源一本账 (“National data resources single ledger”) : a unified national inventory and registry treating data as a measurable factor of production	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A prerequisite for a developed data factor market Without defined ownership and valuation of data, markets cannot form prices or enforce ownership rights
Innovation Policy	Innovation funding	4 企业研发准备金制度 (“Enterprise R&D reserve fund system”) : firms are required to set aside dedicated R&D funds separate from tax deductions	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensures sustained private R&D investment even through economic downturns Also makes R&D independent from annual profit cycles
		5 债券市场“科技板” (“Technology board within bond market”) : entails the designation of a dedicated tech board in the bond market as a policy target	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Bridges a financing gap for firms that are too early for equity-related solutions but also too unconventional to fit standard bond criteria
	Regulatory support / governance	6 触发式监管 (“Trigger-based regulation”) : regulation that activates only when the activity becomes materially large enough to require it	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Paired with sandbox regulations, it lowers barriers to entry for emerging industries by replacing traditional pre-approval frameworks
		7 “模芯云用”协同创新 (“Model>chip>cloud>application integrated innovation”) : a sequencing doctrine for domestic AI development prioritizing foundation models first, then chip, cloud, and application layers	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Addresses China's gaps in the AI sector by coordinating investment rather than treating each layer separately DeepSeek (not other LLM) could be seen as default base

Source: CMG synthesis on formal policy documents released on gov.cn

New concepts (2/3): 19 entirely new policy concepts/terms across 5 policy areas of 15th Five-Year-Plan full text

Theme		Observed new term in 15 th FYP	Significance	CMG interpretation
Innovation policy	AI	8 具身智能 (“Embodied intelligence/AI”) : names <i>physical</i> AI systems (humanoid robots, autonomous machines) as a future industry priority beyond software and language models	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> China already seems to be targeting AI's next frontier Software-only AI has limited industrial and defense application compared to systems that can physically act
		9 超大规模智算集群 (“Ultra-large-scale intelligent computing clusters”) : allows for data hub infrastructure at significantly larger scale than previously allowed	◐	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adopted in context of CN-US AI compute competition Defined large clusters could indicate awareness of risks of overcapacity from disorganized data center buildouts
	Talent / human capital	10 建立高技术人才移民制度 (“High-tech talent immigration system”) : formal immigration regime (not just talent attraction incentives) explicitly using "移民制度" for the first time in Chinese policy language	◐	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> China now competing directly with the US, EU, and Singapore for permanent residency of global tech talent, not just temporary recruitment
Green policy	Green transition	11 碳排放双控 (“Dual control of carbon emissions - volume & intensity”) : shifts the regulatory target from energy consumption to carbon emissions directly, controlling both absolute volume and emissions intensity	●	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Incentivizes switching to clean energy rather than just consuming less Enables smoother nuclear/renewable substitution
		12 产品碳足迹核算/碳标识认证 (Product-level carbon footprint accounting & labelling) : extends carbon accounting to the individual product level via a certification and labelling regime	◐	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Defensive response to the EU's CBAM* China seems to be building its own compatible standard to protect export competitiveness and set its own terms
		13 非化石能源十年倍增行动 (“Non-fossil energy ten-year doubling action”) : frames the non-fossil energy target as a named action program with an explicit doubling commitment instead of a percentage ratio goal	◐	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Signals strong commitment, global climate leadership "Doubling" entails a clear and measurable objective while percentages be easily “distorted” via statistics

Source: CMG synthesis on formal policy documents released on gov.cn

*Note: CBAM = Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

New concepts (3/3): 19 entirely new policy concepts/terms across 5 policy areas of 15th Five-Year-Plan full text

Theme		Observed new term in 15 th FYP	Significance	CMG interpretation
Social reforms	Aging	14 <u>银发经济 + 银发产品认证制度 (Silver economy + product certification system)</u> : treats the aging-related consumption as a distinct market/sector with a named certification regime, statistical system, and private enterprise cultivation		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As China's elderly population becomes the world's largest, this builds a legible, investable market around it China's certification standard could become exportable
	Labor	15 <u>渐进式延迟法定退休年龄 ("Gradual delay of statutory retirement age")</u> : official institutionalization of long-standing policy debate		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The reform direction is now difficult to reverse The word 渐进式 ("gradual") serves to manages public anxiety about a deeply unpopular policy
		16 <u>规模性失业风险防范化解机制 ("Mass unemployment risk prevention mechanism")</u> : elevates mass unemployment to a named systemic risk category alongside real estate and local debt, with a dedicated institutional response		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Positions the state as the last-resort employer AI/automation could disrupt the labor market faster than other sectors or retraining policies could absorb
Global governance & diplomacy	Data/AI gov. & dipl.	17 <u>可信数据空间 ("Trusted data spaces")</u> : controlled environments allowing parties to share and use data without surrendering ownership or control, which mirrors the EU's Gaia-X framework		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> China might seek to join the global conversation via compatibility with European data governance norms while maintaining its own domestic equivalent
		18 <u>离岸算力设施 (Offshore computing power facilities)</u> : names overseas/offshore data center construction as part of digital diplomacy infrastructure		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Connects tech infrastructure to geopolitical influence Extends Chinese compute capacity beyond domestic jurisdiction while keeping it under Chinese control
		19 <u>平权、互信、多元、共赢的全球AI生态 ("Equal-rights, win-win, pluralistic" global AI governance)</u> : A four-character normative framework positioning China as an AI governance norm-shaper rather than a rule-taker		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Builds a competing multilateral vocabulary where China sets the terms in AI global governance frameworks Targets the Global South as an alternative audience

Source: CMG synthesis on formal policy documents released on gov.cn

15th FYP KPIs: structure largely unchanged vs 14th FYP – only three new targets and iterations on specific metrics

KPI categorization		Official 15 th FYP KPI indicator	2030 KPI targets	Change vs. 14 th FYP
Economy	<i>Growth</i>	• GDP growth (%)	Keep reasonable growth	Unchanged
	<i>Quality of growth</i>	• Labor productivity growth (%)	Growing faster than GDP	Unchanged
	<i>Urbanization</i>	• Urbanization rate (%)	67.9% (2025) → 71% (2030)	Higher target set
Innovation	<i>R&D input</i>	• Total R&D expenditure growth (%)	Annual growth > 7%	Unchanged
	<i>R&D output</i>	• High-value invention patents per 10,000 people (units)	16 (2025) → > 22 (2030)	Higher target set
	<i>Digitalization</i>	• Digital economy value-added in share of GDP (%)	10.5% (2025) → > 12.5% (2030)	Higher target set
Social policy	<i>Job creation</i>	• Unemployment rate in urban areas (%)	Keep < 5.5%	Unchanged
	<i>Household income</i>	• Per capital disposable income growth (%)	Growing in line with GDP	Unchanged
	<i>Labor quality</i>	• Average educated years of working-age population (years)	11.3 (2025) → 11.7 (2030)	Higher target set
	Healthcare	• Number of registered physicians and nurses per 1,000 people	3.1 → 3.7, 4.3 → 5.1	New target: on nursery
	Elderly care	• Nursing care beds in share of all beds in elderly care institutions (%)	68% (2025) → 73% (2030)	New target
	<i>Childcare</i>	• Increase in childcare service enrollment for Children aged ≤ 3 (%)	Aggregate 6% by 2030	Adjusted target: capacity → enroll.
	<i>Life expectancy</i>	• Average life expectancy (years)	79.25 (2025) → 80 (2030)	Higher target set
Green policy	<i>Carbon control</i>	• CO ₂ emissions reduction per GDP unit (%)	Aggregate 17% by 2030	Lower target set (18% in 14 th FYP)
	Energy shift	• Non-fossil-fuel consumption in share of total energy consumption (%)	21.7% (2025) → 25% (2030)	New target
	<i>Pollution control</i>	• PM2.5 concentration in prefecture-level (and above) cities (μg/m ³)	28 (2025) → < 27 (2030)	Higher target set
	<i>Ecology</i>	• Share of surface water meeting “good” quality standard (%)	80% (2025) → 85% (2030)	Higher target set
	<i>Ecology</i>	• Forest coverage (%)	25.1% (2025) → 25.8% (2030)	Higher target set
Security	<i>Food security</i>	• Grain production capacity (trillion ‘jin’)	1.39 (2025) → 1.45 (2030)	Higher target set
	<i>Energy security</i>	• Energy production capacity (billion tons of standard coal equivalent)	51.3 (2025) → 58 (2030)	Higher target set

Agenda

1 China's 15th Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030)

- Recap policy trajectory since 2020/2021 and China's playbook for dealing with Trump 2.0
- Select formal analysis
- **Select substantive analysis**

2 Select strategy inputs for foreign business

Top-level view: 10 key policy evolutions of the 15th vs. 14th Five-Year-Plan – sequence follows FYP chapters



#1 Systemic ‘anti-involution’ against excessive competition

- New policy concept compared to 14th FYP, with 4 explicit intervention measures— price governance, capacity coordination, standard setting, quality inspection
- ‘Anti-involution’ thinking is added into China’s new industrial policy approach—to develop NQPF in a way more tailored to local endowments (因地制宜)

Deep-dive #1



#6 Fiscal reform towards better central-local dynamics

- New policy thinking to allow more autonomy for local governments to explore new revenue sources
- New policy thinking for more tax revenue sharing with local governments
- New policy thinking for central gov to bear more fiscal spending responsibilities



#2 NQPF*-centered next-level industrial policy framework

- Shifted efforts to commercialization and industrialization (scaling up) of emerging industries, to double aggregate value-added of 6 ‘new economic pillars’ (新兴支柱)
- Addressed new policy focus on funding and risk-sharing mechanism for future industries, ensuring sufficient investment while managing early-stage uncertainty

Deep-dive #2



#7 Novel outward logic and policy support ambition

- Cross-border finance, infrastructure connectivity and security/governance priorities
- New policy tone to better coordinate / balance export and OFDI
- New goal to build up ‘comprehensive overseas service system’ (海外综合服务体系)
- New explicit tone to support overseas expansion of Chinese tech players (e.g. digital)



#3 Pushing for large-scale AI deployment across sectors

- AI seen as an overarching infrastructure, stronger implementation push with “AI+ initiative” to accelerate rolling-out large-scale AI applications / commercialization
- New focus on AI infrastructure building—‘national computing network’ (全国一体化算力网), computing capacity, advanced algorithms, data utilization

Deep-dive #3



#8 Shifted investment focus to ‘invest in people’ (投资于人)

- New policy concept compared to 14th FYP, meaning stronger social policy efforts to improve people’s welfare incl. public service, social security
- Stronger implementation push for fertility support and elderly-care service offering
- Stronger implementation push for ‘full-career-cycle skill training’



#4 New strategic rationale to build “national unified market”

- More systemic approach to tackle market fragmentation, incl. to redistribute tax gains across value chain (where products are produced vs where consumed)
- New policy implementation efforts incl. introducing nationally unified market access negative list for private capital (全国一张清单)

Deep-dive #4



#9 Re-elevated ambition for the “green transition”

- Shifted governance approach from energy-use-centered to carbon-centered, with systemic carbon control approach via carbon KPI for governments and enterprises
- New ambition for green infrastructure building—4T RMB investment to ‘new power system’ (新型电力系统), to build 100+ ‘zero-carbon industrial park’ (零碳园区)



#5 Service economy as a consumption growth lever

- New policy ambition on fully releasing the growth potential in service economy
- New policy implementation program to expand high-quality supply across 9 service areas—transport, housework service, online entertainment, travel-living, car after-market, foreign traveler service, live shows, sports events, experiential (体验式)



#10 “De-risking” steps up geo-economic capacity and power

- New policy goal to strengthen capacity to defend national security interests regarding foreign affairs incl. anti-sanction, anti-long-arm-jurisdiction
- New goal to improve tools to deal with foreign sanctions of foreign influence e.g. export control, investment screening

Note*: NQPF = “New-quality productive forces”, China’s new industrial policy concept introduced in 2023, focusing on innovation-driven industrial upgrading

'Anti-involution': first-ever elevation into a FYP, using a tool-box consisting of systemic and sector-level levers

Policy measures	Systemic level							
	Restriction of local gov. policy	• Limit local governments from offering excessive preferential policy incentives to attract investment						
	"Price war" governance	• Provide government or regulatory guidance to curb destructive price competition in key industries and stabilize market prices						
	Domestic demand expansion	• Stimulate domestic consumption to support market growth						
	Overseas support	• Assist firms in expanding internationally to reduce domestic overcapacity pressure						
	(Potential) RMB appreciation	• As an external rebalancing lever to curb low-price export incentive and push capacity off-shoring						
	Sector-level							
		Steel	Cement	Chemicals	NEVs	Batteries	Solar (PV)	Machinery
	Industry-association price coordination	●	○	○	○	○	●	○
	Export management	○	○	○	○	○	○	○
Capacity offshoring	○	○	○	○	●	○	○	
Raising industrial standards	●	○	●	●	●	●	○	
Industry-association capacity coordination	●	○	○	○	○	●	○	
Market trends	Consolidation	●	○	○	○	○	●	○
	OFDI	○	○	○	○	●	○	○
	Price stabilization	●	○	○	○	○	●	○
Aggregated effect		Strong	Limited	Mid	Mid	Strong	Strong	Limited

Given weak domestic demand plus unfavorable trade environment, the overcapacity-consuming cycle will likely take years to be closed

Industrial-tech policy: 15th FYP outlines a new and clearer policy framework vs. 14th FYP, reliant on 6 key pillars

Upgrade “traditional industries” *(non-exhaustive)*

Steel	Petrochemical
Vessel	Construction
Textile	Industrial software
Rare earth/rare metal	Machinery & equipment
Electric component	Machine tool

Policy logic
Standardization, green transition, supply chain security, “anti-involution”

Develop “emerging & future industries” *(exhaustive)*

Emerging industry (新兴产业)		Future industry (未来产业)	
New gen. IT	Robotics	Quantum tech	Biomanufact.
New energy	Biomedicine	Hydrogen	Nuclear energy
New material	High-end equipment	Brain-computer Interface	Embodied AI
NEV	Aerospace	6G	

Policy logic
Industrialize frontier technologies, cultivate tech companies, “sandbox regulation” to promote and test innovation

“From 0 to 1 innovation” (原始创新)* *(exhaustive)*

High-performance AI chip	Controlled nuclear fusion
Brain-inspired general AI	Artificial life
Quantum communication	Organ-on-chip
Quantum computing	Lunar research station
Quantum measurement	Near-earth asteroid defense system

Policy logic
Invent new technologies (“tech of tech”), research-industry cooperation, “advance-planning” (超前部署)

“New Infrastructure” (新型基础设施)

National computing power network	Satellite internet
Data infrastructure	Low-altitude infrastructure

“Systemic innovation” (体系化创新)

Industry-university-research integration	National labs
Regional innovation centers	Literature platform

Technology opening-up (科技开放合作新格局)

Global scientists fund	Support FIEs in local innovation
Cross-border science data exchange	Set up int. tech organizations in China

□ Elevated importance in 15th FYP vs. 14th FYP

*: there are more than these 10 “from 0 to 1” technologies listed in 15th FYP – these 10 are a selection of examples








15th FYP departs from a technology catch-up logic by putting forward a frontier industry and original innovation-centered framework

Integrating the ‘industry-academic-research’ innovation value-chain (产学研一体化), as key enabler for “NQPF”

	Talent cultivation	Basic research	Need identification	Applied research	Product/tech R&D	Commercial application	Market feedback
					Core reform efforts		
Universities	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Targeted scientific talent cultivation General knowledge 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Increase the share of S&T expenditure on basic research, especially subjects with “urgent national needs” 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage research with “high risk and high value” Encourage diversification of research topics 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Give scientists greater flexibility and power to self-decide directions Improve research result transfer to industries 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct joint researches, guided by practical needs of companies (企业主导的产学研深度融合) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
Research institutes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A
SOEs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Conduct “original Innovation” (原始创新) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Emphasize research serving national strategic needs 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Focus on forward-looking, strategic, and emerging industries (前瞻性战略性新兴产业) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evaluate SOEs not only from market success but also their “strategic missions” (国有企业履行战略使命评价制度) 	
POEs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage capable POEs to lead national research projects Further open-up major scientific research infrastr. (国家重大科研基础设施) to POEs 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Both R&D for the market as well as encouraging capable POEs to develop cutting-edge technologies 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mostly market-oriented commercialization and product feedback 	
FIEs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A (no specific mentioning in industry-academic-research cooperation, regarding early-phase innovation) 				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Expand the catalog of industries that encourage foreign investment and reasonably reduce the negative list for foreign investment access Improve FIE market access with “national/local treatment” (国民待遇) 		
Finance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Strengthen financial support for national projects and tech-SMEs Encourage more long-term investment in early-phase innovations, especially in “hard technologies” (硬科技) 		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	
International cooperation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Encourage foreign high-level science and engineering universities to open campus in China Promote international S&T exchanges, and encourage international S&T organizations to establish offices in China 			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> N/A 	

'Invest in people': 5 key policy pillars to improve people's livelihood – only 4 of 14 measures fully implemented


Social policy pillar	High-level policy measure	Policy maturity?	Implementation?
 Residency / "Hukou"	1) Lower threshold for rural migrants to acquire urban residency	Comprehensive framework	Nationwide roll-out
	2) Easier access for rural migrants to social security and public service at their residence place	Comprehensive framework	Continued piloting
 Employment & income	3) Ensure job creation and stabilize employment	Comprehensive framework	Nationwide roll-out
	4) Protect the unemployed individuals and support their re-employment	New single policies	Early pilot phase
	5) Protect the labor rights including in salary payment, injury insurance, holidays, etc.	Comprehensive framework	Continued piloting
	<u>6) Increase labor income and broaden income sources, esp. capital gain</u>	Building towards framework	Early pilot phase
	7) Ensure income equality through redistribution mechanism	Building towards framework	Continued piloting
 Public service	8) Education: easier and more regionally equal access to basic education opportunities	Building towards framework	Continued piloting
	9) Healthcare: reduce people's healthcare payment burden by enhancing medical insurance	Comprehensive framework	Nationwide roll-out
	<u>10) Housing: expand supply of affordable housing</u>	New single policies	Early pilot phase
 Social security	11) Broaden pension coverage and enhance cross-region redistribution of pension funds	Comprehensive framework	Nationwide roll-out
	12) Enhance social assistance and welfare programs for venerable groups	Comprehensive framework	Continued piloting
 Aging / fertility	<u>13) Fertility support through subsidies and expanding public child-care services</u>	Comprehensive framework	Early pilot phase
	14) Elderly-care support through expanding public elderly-care service	Comprehensive framework	Continued piloting

Note: underlined font = most critical policy factors to help release household consumption potential in nearer-term

Source: CMG synthesis on formal policy documents released on gov.cn

Green transition: “green transition” ambition remains solid, approach-wise more systemic than 14th FYP

China’s green policy framework as per 15th FYP



Comparative view vs 14th FYP

- **Political ambition:** consistent with the 14th FYP, the 15th FYP defines the green transition as one of few top-level development goals
- **Policy framework:** the 14th FYP already touched on the 15th FYP’s three specific policy focus domains, but they were not yet structured into a systemic green policy framework as with 15th FYP
- **Infrastructure:** 15th FYP’s sets new infrastructure scheme, with a “new power system” to better fit generation, transmission and consumption of green power, and “zero-carbon industrial parks” to facilitate green industrial activities
- **Governance:** 15th FYP shifts governance approach from energy-use-centered to carbon-centered—esp. adjusted government KPI to control carbon emission itself instead of energy use

Agenda

1 China's 15th Five-Year-Plan (2026-2030)

- Recap policy trajectory since 2020/2021 and China's playbook for dealing with Trump 2.0
- Select formal analysis
- Select substantive analysis

2 **Select strategy inputs for foreign business**

Strategy inputs (1/2)

- **Getting China right**
 - E.g. policy trajectory since 2020/2021 or China's strategic playbook in dealing with Trump 2.0
 - Up-to-date intelligence
- **“Multipolar mindset”**
 - A new executive mindset for European and international HQs to deal more effectively with an evolving international order
- **Strategic self-reflection**
 - What was past business success in the Chinese market really driven by?
 - Reason to exist in China? E.g. win in China to defend home market
- **Strategic premises**
 - China development scenarios *(cf. illustration)*
 - IR-global trade scenarios
 - China as emerging tech winner?
 - Market presence vs. value-creation (PE logic)
- **Strategy scope and granularity**
 - China, vs. third- and home markets
 - “In China for China” vs. “tactical strategies” *(cf. illustration)*
- **Strategy horizon**
 - Long-term minded decision-making?

Strategy inputs (2/2)

- **HQ-subsidary factor**
 - Top-down vs. bottom-up
 - Interest re-balancing
 - Trust / geopolitics
 - Framework-structured communication
- **Exemplary strategy paradigms / strategies**
 - Conventional strategy reinforcement
 - E.g. innovation
 - Capabilities-focused
 - E.g. go-to-market
 - Business prioritization
 - Portfolio exercise
 - Footprint / localization
 - “Operating like a Chinese firm”
 - Co-localization / new home-base (*cf. illustration*)
 - “De-risking”
 - Localizing sourcing / manufacturing
 - Hibernation

2035 China development scenarios : 1 base case scenario and 2 key deviation scenarios

Key geopolitical factors

*US-China confrontation +
non-favorable external
environment*

*US-China confrontation +
favorable external
environment*

*US-China deal / stability +
favorable external
environment*

*US-China deal / stability +
non-favorable external
environment*

China's agency

*Ineffective
governance, policy
and reform
execution and
diplomacy*

Economic stagnation

*Deviation scenario – failed balancing of structural reforms vs.
post-Covid economic recovery*

Economic stagnation

*Deviation scenario – failed balancing
of structural reforms vs.
post-Covid economic recovery*

*Partially effective
governance, policy,
reform execution
and diplomacy*

Dual Circulation – “defensive”

Realizing geopolitical resilience goals as per 14th FYP intent

Base case

Dual Circulation – “offensive”

*Realizing the “large-gravitational field” with
high economic integration with “Global South”*

*(Very) effective
governance, policy,
reform execution
and diplomacy*







Dual Circulation – “extreme” (“Self-Circulation”)

*Realizing “self-circulation” (自我循环)
capacity incl. ‘domestic demand system’*

“Sino-centric trading network”

*Deviation scenario – realizing strategic playbook of dealing with Trump 2.0 to shape for
multipolarity and unabating, China-backed economic globalization*

Business: differentiated “tactical strategies” can be observed among successful Chinese machinery players

Strategy observed	Descriptions	Illustrative Chinese machinery player
<u>Cross-provincial growth</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multi-province operating footprint to place production closer to demand, expand regional market access, and improve delivery and O&M service • Regionally tailored market model to align product focus with local demand and strengthen market fit 	 <p>SANY 三一重工</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operates in 7 regional industrial parks, and assigning different facilities to different product lines, e.g., excavators in Shanghai, mining equipment in Shenyang
<u>Distribution-led growth</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand market access through a dense sales-and-service network rather than relying on a single sales channel • Differentiate through fast-response service and spare-parts coverage at a country level 	 <p>ZOOMLION 中联重科</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Operates 900+ distributors, 400+ partner service stations, and 16 spare-parts warehouses, forming a comprehensive sales network and a service system
<u>Sub-sector specialization</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Focus on one machinery niche to concentrate R&D, manufacturing, and sales resources rather than spreading capabilities across multiple categories • Build depth within the niche through a broader product range, stronger technical know-how, and clearer customer positioning 	 <p>Dingli Machinery 浙江鼎力</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Specializes in aerial work platforms (AWPs), with USD36million in 2024 R&D investment and a position among the world’s top 10 AWP manufacturers
<u>Digitalization-led growth</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embed digital capabilities into the product through intelligent control, autonomous navigation etc. to increase product competitiveness • Expand from standalone machines to intelligent solutions by combining equipment with fleet management, digital-management systems, etc. 	 <p>Anhui HELI 安徽合力</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Positions in forklifts and intelligent logistics, offers intelligent fleet management based on cloud and IoT, and develops autonomous logistics solution
<u>Services-led growth</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capture after-sales revenue through services such as maintenance, spare parts, repairs, and lifecycle support • Use service to deepen customer lock-in, by building long-term support networks and expanding into offerings such as training and remanufacturing 	 <p>XCMG 徐工集团</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Builds a service model expanded beyond basic after-sales support into maintenance, training, equipment management, financial services, etc.
<u>OEM-partnership growth</u>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Scale through OEM platform partnerships by supplying core components or systems to major machinery makers • Embedding into foreign and CN OEM ecosystems, which broadens customer access and reduces dependence on any single end-market channel 	 <p>Hengli Hydraulic 恒立液压</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Growth by serving as a core supplier to a broad base of leading OEMs, including Caterpillar, Kobelco, Hitachi Construction Machinery, Kubota, SANY, and XCMG

Succeeding in the local market also requires European business to using clear and suited “tactical strategies”, not just “in China for China”

Beyond sourcing, 4 key strategy paradigms of European MNCs observed to deal with Chinese green players

Observed key strategy paradigms

Illustrative sector vs company examples

Going alone, primarily to defend home market (without China reliance)

- Batteries
- Wind
- Hydrogen
- NEVs



Northvolt builds a fully European battery value chain to reduce exposure to Chinese suppliers
Vestas & Ørsted pursue a Europe-centric model in the wind industry for the EU market
Thyssenkrupp - Nucera competes with proprietary electrolysis technology developed and manufactured outside China

Co-localizing in China to compete locally and globally

- NEVs
- Wind
- Hydrogen



VW set up a dedicated NEV JV in Anhui to access local scale and supply chains.
Siemens-Gamesa has major manufacturing operations in China to serve the Chinese market while sustaining global competitiveness
HydrogenPro manufactures electrolyzers in China to lower costs, while retaining IP and branding

Strategic partnership / co-investment with Chinese firms

- NEVs
- Batteries
- Wind
- Hydrogen
- Solar



Stellantis co-invests in battery manufacturing, e.g. in Spain
ACC builds EU gigafactories while sourcing Chinese production equipment at scale
Air Liquide and Sinopec to jointly develop hydro energy tech
Bee Solar and Huasun have signed a cooperation agreement focused on solar panel components and production capabilities in Europe

Distribution- or services focused partnering with Chinese firms

- Batteries
- Wind
- Solar



Wärtsilä purchases Chinese battery cells and systems, integrates and services storage projects in Europe
Numerous SMEs, dealerships, and developers import Chinese wind turbines, solar modules, and EVs to install / directly sell in Europe, solely focusing on distribution.

Source: IEA; European Commission; BloombergNEF; company disclosures

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